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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an investigation in to British policy towards Iran between the Yalta Conference and 
the resolution of the Iranian Crisis of early 1946 and the subsequent impact of those policies upon 
her relationship with her enigmatic partner, the USSR. It investigates the development of ideas 
within the British Embassy in Tehran and more especially within the Foreign Office relating to 
the future of Iran, which had been the subject of an Anglo-Soviet occupation since August 1941 
and which had been, through its bounteous supply of oil, of vital economic importance to Britain 
since the late nineteenth century. The paper calls in to question the assertion that British foreign 
policy in the immediate aftermath of the war was based entirely upon the principles of the so- 
called 'New World Order', and its instruments, the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations. 
Instead, the paper contends that elements within the British government actively sought a 
compromise arrangement with the Soviet Union in which Britain and Russia would share in the 
exploitation of Iranian resources. However, in the final analysis it is argued that the British 
government abandoned this stance when the US government resolved that Iran must not fall, even 
in part, into the Soviet orbit. The failure of British policy is exposed; British influence in Iran was 
discredited to the extent that she was forced to abandon the south western oilfields in 1951, US 
planners sought to distance themselves from their partners at every turn and the Soviet Union had 
been alienated even further from the allied mainstream.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a little known fact that the Gulf state of Iran was subject to an Anglo-Soviet occupation 
between August 1941 and March 1946. At the time of invasion, these two countries, thrown 
together in unlikely alliance by the necessities of global war, represented the overwhelming 
mainstay of the anti-fascist alliance. The invasion and occupation of Iran was a unique event 
in the scheme of that alliance and the logistical practicalities of such different peoples 
combining in a foreign environment became manifest from the outset. Soviet Russia had 
bewildered the British government from the moment that she joined Hitler's assault on 
Poland. When Germany's Panzers turned their guns towards the Soviet Union, Britain and 
Russia entered into what was, below a superficial veneer of diplomatic cordiality, one of the 
most contrived and mutually contemptuous alliances in military history. Yet both powers 
were intrinsically aware that each could not survive the German onslaught without the 
backing of the other, resulting in the solidarity of an alliance which stretched from the signing 
of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty in May 1942 through to the calamitous months approaching the 
end of the war in Europe.
The occupation and withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran was in many ways the litmus test of 
the practicability of the relationship in both war and, later, in peace. For four years and more 
troops and officials from both sides worked in close proximity. Relations at both a diplomatic 
and political level were often strained, never less than tense, but simply forced to work. The 
British people, lost in their admiration for the manner in which the Soviet masses had 
withstood and then, at a terrible cost, repelled the Nazi menace entered the post-war world 
believing that the ideological divides which had split capitalist Britain and Communist Russia 
since 1917 could be overcome. However, behind the closed doors of Whitehall, Moscow and 
Tehran the governments of Britain and Russia had already concluded that close co-operation 
was unlikely if not impossible; the great alliance, stretched by mutual paranoia, crumbled 
within a year of peace. Nowhere was the deterioration of the Anglo-Soviet alliance better 
illustrated than in Iran.
This paper is not an examination of British policy upon the people or government of Iran. It is 
an exploration of the collapse of Anglo-Soviet co-operation in Iran and the reasons behind the 
descent of the occupation in to what has become commonly labelled the 'Iranian Crisis'. Due 
to the limitations of the material available, the scope of this study is limited to the 
development of inter-allied relations in so much as they were affected by developments in 
Iran. British Iranian policy, with its frequent concern for the continued development of British 
interests in the southwest, had a detrimental impact upon the development of those 
relationships. This leads to the crux of the paper; did British planners decide, between January 
1946 and the depths of the crisis in March 1946, that the basis of British policy should not be 
the strict adherence to the ethos of the new world order, but instead the belief that the 
continued development of British possessions in south western Iran, and especially the 
refinery in Abadan? In short, did the British government disregard her altruism, the well-being 
of the Iranian people, the Allied mandate to return the world to peace and so on, with the aim 
of short-term economic aggrandisement?
This thesis will show that British policy was far from homogenous and that, consequently, the 
question of British moral conduct cannot satisfactorily be addressed given the information 
available. The Foreign Office was under-prepared for peace and the evolution of its Soviet 
policy painfully slow. Few contemporary observers had predicted the extreme direction of 
Soviet policy in Germany and Eastern Europe and, fewer still, the Middle East. The FO 
reacted indifferently to American charges of British duplicity in Iran and was again slow in 
recognising the significance of American policy in what had been a British concern. 
Ministries more directly concerned with reaping the benefits of Iranian oil, especially those of 
the Treasury and the Ministry of Fuel and Power, actively encouraged the amicable division 
of Persia between Britain, the Soviet Union and, if politically expedient, the United States. 
Overall, British policy was reactive rather than proactive and inadequate for its task, which 
was the safe delivery of Iran to peacetime and the continued harmony of inter-allied relations.
The vast majority of the primary research undertaken for this thesis revolves around British 
Foreign and Cabinet Office files located in the Public Record Office. As wide an array of 
secondary sources have been consulted, however, with a view to avoiding an over-reliance
upon these sources. One is aware that the young historian must heed Robert Skidelsky 
warning that:
The release of official papers has led to the writing of some very official history. 
On any but the most resolute historian, all these memoranda had the same effect 
that they had on the Ministers for whom they were first produced: to show that 
nothing different could possibly have been done. 1
The key challenge in compiling this thesis has been avoiding making a blind acceptance of the 
doctrines prescribed by Foreign Office officials without applying, in rigorous manner, the 
benefit of hindsight which we are so fortunate to possess. One must heed Skidelsky's warning 
that 'A historian who comes, naked, to the corridors of power is almost as likely to write 
conservative history as is the politician who arrives in the same condition to make 
conservative history'. 2
1 R. Skidelsky, "Going to War with Germany: Between Revisionism and Orthodoxy", in Encounter, 39 (July
1972), p 58
2 Skidelsky, p 58
CHAPTER ONE
Iranian history in the post-war period was characterised by the failure of British policies, the 
gradual retreat of Soviet influence, especially from the south of the country, and the 
solidification of US power. Resentment at the British exploitation of commercial interests, in 
particular of south-west Persian oil which was refined in the massive Abadan refinery, was an 
important motivation behind the rise of a hitherto unknown quantity; Iranian nationalism 
based upon the reclamation of Iranian resources from foreign powers for the Iranian 
government and people. The eventual evacuation of the Abadan fields in October 1951 and 
the consequent withdrawal of British influence from Iran was the direct result of British 
policies failing to achieve any of its objectives. British policy failed to discourage the Soviet- 
sponsored insurgence in Azerbaijan. British commercial interests were first threatened and 
then, remarkably, in 1951 ripped from the British grasp. And Britain was left without even the 
solace of the sympathy of the United States, whose patience was eroded by perceived British 
hypocrisies and violations of the fluid moral code embedded in the international 
consciousness by the Atlantic Charter. By the end of the 1940's Britain had slipped from her 
hereunto dominant power in the Middle East and the purveyor of the richest supply of oil in 
the region to a marginalised, discredited imperialist intruder about to be put out to grass by the 
rise of Iranian nationalism, augmented by a common hatred of the British imperial policy.. 
Britain had appeared to be the natural watchman of the Middle East but, partly through the 
handling of the Iranian situation, the United States found it increasingly hard to entrust their 
interests in Britain's hands. As Iranians, and the many Iranian governments in particular, 
became increasingly desperate at the level of Anglo-Soviet interference it was to America that 
the occupied nation turned. By the time that the schedule for withdrawal neared in March 
1946, the key factor in Iran's future had shifted from Britain's diplomatic policies to a 
question of the US' commitment to its altruistic public declarations.
One should appreciate the level of British economic and political concern for the course of 
Anglo-Iranian relations throughout the Twentieth Century in order to comprehend some of the 
motivations that underpinned British planning during and after the Second World War. Britain 
had assumed the dominant position in Iran during the 19th Century as the principle beneficiary
of a Tobacco Reggie and other economic concessions by the Qajar dynasty in Iran. The most 
crucial of these concessions was in the drilling for oil, leading Britain to conclude a spheres of 
influence arrangement with Russia in 1907. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) began 
trading after the award of a major concession by the Qajar Dynasty in 1901. The discovery of 
oil in copious amounts in 1908 was followed by the assumption of a fifty-one per cent stake in 
the Company by the British government in 1913. Centred upon the abundant wells of South 
Western Iran and the enormous refinery on the island of Abadan, the AIOC management, with 
the support of the FO, created an quasi-autonomous region in the south of Iran, operating 
almost entirely unfettered by the Iranian parliament - the Majlis. By 1938 Iran accounted for 
the production of 4.4 per-cent of the non-communist world's total oil supply and clearly had 
the potential to increase its output. The Company exploited thousands of indigenous workers 
and utterly failed to reinvest in the local community or provide adequate welfare facilities for 
its workforce; a fact that was to alienate leading Iranian statesmen for decades and which 
provided an easy target for Soviet propagandists in the 1940s.
Centuries of decline relative to the west had certainly scarred Iran and had left her open to 
exploitation by foreign powers. Moreover, the incumbent Qajar dynasty were the last in a long 
line of absolutists and despots which had welcomed foreign exploitation so long as their 
power based had been solidified as a result of economic and military assistance. Between 
1906 and 1911, early nationalists expressed revulsion at British and Russian exploitation that 
was one of the most oft-quoted motivations behind the Constitutional Revolution, which was 
to sweep away the Qajar dynasty. The Revolution gave birth to the first Iranian Majlis, which 
was to be the voice box of the anti-imperialist opposition. However, there was no escape for 
the population of Iran from the First World War. Some estimates claim that as, successively, 
Russian, Ottoman, German and British troops occupied parts of Iran, up to a quarter of the 
entire population perished. 3
Bolshevik Russia, despite proclaiming her ideological commitment to ending global 
imperialism, was not quick to withdraw Soviet influence behind its own borders after the
3 M. P. Zirinsky, "Britain and the Rise of Reza Shah, 1921-26" in International Journal of Middle East Studies. 
24 (1992) pp 639-663.
1917 revolution. A Soviet inspired revolt in the Gilan region found a popular focus Anti- 
British sentiment and also in a hatred of the Tehran regime which allowed Britain to develop 
this position of pre-eminence. For a brief period in May 1920 the region was proclaimed a 
Soviet Socialist Republic and received extensive support from Lenin's Russia. The unsound 
foundations of the rebellion though soon led to its collapse, accompanied by Lenin's repeal of 
the Anglo-Russian Spheres of Influence deal agreed in 1907 and with it the temporary retreat 
of the Soviet government from Iran.
As a consequence Britain enjoyed a pre-eminent position in Iran. The British Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Curzon, recognising Soviet Russia's internal and therefore external 
vulnerability, attempted to consolidate Britain's near monopoly in 1919 by proposing a Treaty 
which would have given Britain control of Iran's finances and armed forces. The treaty, 
negotiated with the subservient Cabinet of Vusuq 1-Dawleh, entered the Iranian constitution 
only briefly and yet appeared to cement the view amongst senior Iranian officials that Iran 
was destined to be Britain's economic tool. As a teacher in Switzerland at the time, the future 
nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mussadiq recalled in his memoirs that upon hearing of 
the passage of the Bill he immediately attempted to obtain Swiss citizenship.4
Although the British military withdrew from Iran in 1921, British influence solidified on the 
political and economic levels. The usurpation of power in Iran by Reza Khan and Sayyid Zia 
al-Din Tabatabai in 1921 has been used as evidence by some of British complicity in the 
affairs of Iran with a view to establishing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the fabric of Iran. 
. Michael P. Zirinsky argues that the FO instructed the British mission in Tehran to persuade 
Ahmad Shah to remove Russian Cossack officers from his army in late October 1921, that the 
British government paid towards the upkeep of the Cossack garrison and provided individual 
advice to the plotters in Tehran. Zirinsky further shows how British officials backed Reza 
Khan at the expense of Zia, who was forced into exile after finding himself without outside 
support and confronted with an army, armed with British weapons, lying solely in the hands 
of Reza. 5
4 Homa Katouzian (ed), Mussadiq's Memoirs (London, 1980) p4 
s Ibid, p 646
Historians find it somewhat difficult to agree to the level of British support for any one group 
in early-Twentieth Century Iran and Reza Khan is no exception to this. The Iranian historian 
Katouzian stresses that Reza, whilst receiving a measure of support from British officials in 
his 1921 triumph, was actually a Soviet stooge throughout his first decade in power. 6 The 
British historian M. E. Yapp, by contrast, argues that Reza Khan was able to play the British 
and Soviet Union off against each other over many years but considers that ultimately the 
Foreign Office held a respectful and distanced watching brief during Reza's initial rule. For 
figures such as Mussadiq though the balance of power in Iran, both in terms of the Reza 
Khan's autocracy and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, engendered an unhealthy departure 
from the progress made during the years of the Constitutional Revolution. 7 Uncertainty about 
the future intentions of Reza in part accounted for the collapse of several Iranian legislatures 
and dictated that Iran was drawn back to autocracy. Despite the vociferous verbal opposition 
presented by prominent members of the Majlis, many of whom were to become key figures in 
later Iranian history, Reza Khan ascended to his omnipotent position of Reza Khan on 31 
October 1925. 8
It was during the occupation and subsequent evacuation of Iran that Britain was to realise the 
cost of its imperialistic pre-war policies in Iran. By time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty in mid-1942, even the most traditional members of Churchill's government were aware 
that Britain's position in the world had changed forever. As the war drained Britain's financial 
reserves, she became increasingly dependant upon the Lend-Lease arrangement with the US 
for financial salvation. Militarily, whilst British troops faced the German foe directly only in 
North Africa, the principle theatre of the war in Europe up until the invasion of Italy in 1943 
was the Eastern Front. For the first time in centuries, British politicians were forced to 
recognise that the survival of the British way of life was not entirely in their own hands. It 
was as a direct result of this realisation that many figures in the British government argued 
that in a post-war settlement, Britain would be forced to make extensive concessions to 
communist Russia. Lord Beaverbrook, for example, resigned in February 1942 when it
6 Katouzian, op cit, p6
7 Katouzian, op cit. plO
became clear that the FO hesitated over the question of recognising some of Russia's war 
gains. Even from the legation in Iran, where British officials were becoming embroiled in a 
tense relationship with their Soviet peers, suggestions were made to the effect that Russia be 
compensated at the expense of occupied countries.
The issue of satiating Russia's need for security after the war at the expense of Iran was to 
become a matter of great diplomatic and moral concern. The central issue revolved around 
balancing two questions. Firstly to what extent should the new world order, should it ever 
come to exist, be prepared to recognise the demands of those countries which had fought 
on the Allied side in the interests of satisfying their urgent need for security? Secondly, 
how effective would the apparently lofty idealism of the Atlantic Charter prove when 
confronted with the machiavellian tendencies of regimes driven by xenophobes? The 
varying perspectives of each power to these issues to each power which dominated the 
interaction of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States when it came to 
deciding on the basis upon which the reconstruction of the post-war world would take 
place.
Martin Kitchen has asserted that the guilt resulting from the Allies failure to open a Second 
Front in Europe left Britain in a disadvantaged position when dealing with Stalin's 
government during the war. The invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 was the 
beginning of the bloodiest conflict that man has yet embarked upon in which the central issue 
was not only the winning of political control over land and people but the survival of the 
Slavic race. Until the entry in to the war of the United States, Britain's survival depended 
almost entirely upon the Soviet people's ability to withstand the Blitzkrieg tactics which had 
swept through the Ukraine within weeks and left Hitler's troops approaching Moscow and 
Stalingrad. Churchill predicted that Russia would fall within six weeks. 9 Yet this was, 
thankfully, an inaccurate assessment of the resolve of the Soviet people and State to tolerate 
the intolerable and to ultimately repel the Nazi onslaught. Russia though, to a greater extent 
even than France and Belgium in the Great War, paid the ultimate price in terms of the impact
8 Katouzian, op cit. plO
of the war on its people, its land and its resources. Soviet planners, from Stalin and Molotov 
downwards, had no intention of allowing post-war uncertainty amongst its allies to catalyse 
another conflict or of allowing the Soviet Union to be susceptible to attacks along its frontiers 
as it had been in 1941. The dilemma for British planners was to establish the extent to which 
they would allow Stalin to go before confronting him.
The invasion of Iran on August 25 th 1941 was motivated by many factors including the need 
to sustain the Soviet war effort and to add credibility to Britain's commitment to the war 
effort; a matter which had been in considerable doubt after the Hess landing in May 1941 
However, Britain's failure to open a Second Front in Europe and the instability of Anglo- 
Soviet relations throughout 1941 rendered the opening of a supply route through Iran of the 
most crucial significance. Moreover, the British Secret Service had alerted the FO to the 
increasingly influential German presence in Iran that had developed a close association with 
Iranian nationalists. Reza Shah, who had become isolated from the British after his accession, 
had been a particularly strong admirer of European nationalism and had looked to Nazi 
Germany as an economic counter-weight to British hegemony since 1933. 10 This fact had not 
been lost on the then Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, who asserted in August 1940 that Iran's 
association with Hitler's Germany would help make Britain's case in the court of public 
opinion even if occupation resulted in the end of Iranian democracy:
The result of the dual occupation might be the disappearance of the Iranian government, 
perhaps temporarily, perhaps forever. But I cannot say that their conduct [by promoting 
Irano-German ties] leads me to defend their cause."
However, between 1940 and the end of the war, the complexion of British politics was to shift 
towards an overriding dependence upon the United States. Lord Halifax and his equally 
antiquated partner, Leo Amery, failed to understand that the tradition in which they had 
conducted diplomatic affairs for decades would be altered beyond recognition, even before the 
end of the war. The US' involvement in Middle Eastern affairs up until this point had been
9 M. Kitchen, "Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union During the Second World War", in The Historical 
Journal. 30. 2 (1987) p420
10 Katouzian, p37
11 Fm? 1/34580. Halifax to Amery, 29.8.41
10
minimised by the dominance of isolationists since 1918 and also through her geographical 
dislocation to the area. Of course the US, unlike Britain, was utterly self-sufficient in terms of 
petroleum. Yet, as historians such as Barry Rubin have showed, the United States had 
privately decided that, having been dragged in to two wars they considered to have been 
caused by European imperial rivalries, the influence of British imperialism was about to be 
checked. 12
The US had displayed signs of interest in Iranian commercial development since the late 
nineteenth century but had managed to preserve their reputation as a non-imperialist power in 
the Middle East up until the outbreak of World War II. A series of unsuccessful missions, 
mainly under the guidance of Presbyterian ministers, led the way for a succession of larger 
scale missions throughout the 1920's. In autumn 1922, Arthur Millspaugh was appointed the 
Iranian Director General of Finance with responsibility to guide Reza Shah through the 
adolescent period of Iranian industrialisation. Barry Rubin argues in 'Cauldron of Turmoil' 
that up to the war, US Middle Eastern policy had been naive, over-trusting of indigenous 
regimes in Saudi Arabia and Iran and over-reliant upon British elements. 13 US policy had truly 
marked them as 'Innocents in the Bazaar' as Rubin described them, full of good intentions 
without grasping the realities of imperial intrigue. However, the Division of Near Eastern 
Affairs (DNEA), headed until March 1942 by the Anglo-sceptic Wallace Murray, had 
resolved to steer US policy away from the British whom, he argued, would be forever 
synonymous with imperial policy. Harry Hoskins, an advisor to the Administration on Middle 
Eastern Affairs and a confidante of President Roosevelt, ascribed that 'the British had done 
nothing in the Middle East and were, therefore, completely discredited throughout the Arab 
world'. 14 Most importantly of all came the realisation in American circles of influence that 
Britain would not accept the global context of the Atlantic Charter - namely that all countries, 
regardless of their geography or politics, should have the right to determine their future so 
long as they pursued a democratic mode of government. The British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill openly claimed that he understood the Charter only to apply to Europe and yet by 
early 1942, the US State Department had made the avocation of the Charter the bedrock of
12 Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East 1941-47 (London 1980)
13 Barry Rubin, Cauldron of Turmoil (New York, 1992)
their future foreign policy. The five-year long British and Soviet bids for influence in Iran was 
to an epiphany for the US which resulted in American policy makers in the Middle East 
actively seeking to avoid shadowing the British line.
The immediate impact of the invasion stemmed from the removal from power of Reza Shah 
and his replacement by his eldest son, Mohammad Reza Shah. 15 The exigencies of war made 
the direct administration of the newly occupied country by the Allies difficult, leading the 
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and the FO to support the installation of a friendly 
indigenous government. Eshraghi has shown how the dismantling of the Iranian military 
undermined the Iranian government's attempts to maintain political independence and to 
thereby oppose any British, Soviet or American attempts to interfere in the running of her 
internal affairs; which had been the primary outcomes of the Tripartite Treaty which 
legitimised the occupation. 16 Her actions in doing so, argues John Beaumont, made Britain a 
partner in an attempt to undermine Iranian sovereignty and this in turn undermined British 
claims to have been the defenders of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the new world 
order. 17 In a brilliant exposition of the diplomatic realities facing Britain in August 1941, 
Beaumont refutes the FO's claim that:
Britain was fighting the evils of Nazism and Fascism not simply to safeguard her 
own national interests but to ensure the stability of the international system.... to 
protect the rights of the weak nations against the strong., to make discussion the 
means of settling disputes between nations .. to re-establishing the rule of 
international law. 18
Beaumont claimed that for Britain to have justifiably claimed the moral high ground, she 
would have needed to have displayed a high-level of diplomatic integrity or else be 
discredited as a viable partner in international arbitration.
M Cited in Rubin, The Great Powers, p24
15 F. Eshraghi, "The Immediate Aftermath of Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran in August 1941", in Middle East 
Studies 198420(l)p28
16 ibid, p35
17 John Beaumont, "Great Britain and the Rights of Neutral Countries: The Case of Iran, 1941" in Journal of 
Contemporary History, 16, 1981, pp213-228
History has judged the Allied invasion of Iran unfavourably. However, the important 
allegation to be examined throughout this paper is that British planners harboured secret 
ambitions and ulterior motives for the occupation of southern Iran that went beyond the 
immediate concerns of supplying the Soviet Union and participating in the war. There is 
evidence, which has been ignored by some official histories, which suggests that, at various 
stages before and after the occupation, British officials strongly considered Iran to be a vital 
component in a post-war settlement involving the Soviet Union. In late August 1941, the 
Secretary of State for India, Sir Leo Amery, began this debate. He asked 'whether we should 
not deliberately do a deal with Russia over Iran as Grey did in 1907 (or Ribbentrop over 
Poland in 1939) encouraging her to do what she likes in the north, so long as she recognises 
our interests in the south'. 19
Amery's plan, in the cold light of day, amounted to a spheres of influence arrangement, which 
had been a fashionable solution to diplomatic rivalry in the previous century but which were 
incongruous with the ethics of western leaders approaching the end of the Second World War.
Amery's view, were it proven to be the foundation of FO policy, would amount to a grave 
indictment of British policy in Iran. In the first instance, any plan to use Iran as a bargaining 
chip in an international settlement was a contradiction of Britain's pledge in the Tripartite 
Treaty 'not to adopt an attitude which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty or 
political independence of Iran'. Iran had been a neutral country, caught innocently in the 
maelstrom of global war. International opinion had tolerated her invasion as part of the 
crusade against fascism but would condone the use of an independent country to meet British 
needs in breach of Treaty obligations. The United States, in particular but not alone, expressed 
their concerns for British policy in Iran as early as December 1942. They stated their belief 
that Britain desired a puppet government in Iran. 20 The State Department further believed that 
in the British mind, 'Iran's needs are of a low priority'. 21
18 ibid, p 213
19 FO 371/27233, India Office to War Office, 29.08.4
;o sr)891.00. Washington, 14.12.42
21 m 371 /3 1431. Tehran to FO, 20.10.46
In the second instance, British planners showed little respect or support for Iranian efforts to 
establish parliamentary democracy through the Majlis. A form of democracy had existed in 
Iran since the Constitutional Revolution and, whilst some distance from a model Parliament, 
the Majlis had outlasted Reza Shah as the most important source of power in the country. As 
the self-proclaimed sponsors of liberal democracy in Iran, Britain should have supported this 
body to the hilt or, alternatively, have pressurised the Iranian ruling classes to modernise the 
Majlis. Yet there are strong indications that Britain perceived Iranian political independence 
as nothing other than a hindrance to British policy. Several figures within the FO argued that 
Iran had 'only a thin veneer of civilisation' and was incapable of reform, modernisation or of 
scaling the heights of democracy.22 Some members of the Foreign Office openly stated that 
Iran could only be effectively governed by an autocrat. Another senior British official in 
Tabriz described the Majlis as 'a monkey house where the politicians chatter, quarrel, and leap 
about intent on their immediate consequential whims, without any effective sense of 
responsibility for their country at large.' 23 Certainly the FO failed to consider that, given that 
the Majlis had been in existence for less than forty years, the achievement in retaining their 
parliament at all was considerable. And regardless of the shortcomings of Iranian democracy, 
Britain had agreed as part of the Tripartite Treaty to preserve an approximation of the Iranian 
political status quo.
These outbursts became symptomatic of influential senior figures in the Foreign Office. Sir 
Reader Bullard himself, perhaps the single greatest influence upon the shaping of Britain's 
Iranian policy, held a startlingly low opinion of the 'average' Iranian and an even lower one of 
Iran's ruling classes. Throughout the occupation, one can trace the evolution of Bullard's 
condescension towards Iranian democracy. By 1945, Bullard had determined that Persia 'was 
not ripe for democracy' and 'was too underdeveloped to enjoy free speech'. 24 As for the 
Majlis, Bullard believed that unless it is 'sat upon, it becomes an obstruction to the occupying 
powers'; hardly the greatest endorsement of British morality or adherence to the principles of 
the Atlantic Charter which advocated self-determination and the promotion of the liberal- 
democratic ideal.
22 FO 371/27206, Persian Gulf Resident to Indian Government, 16.08.41
23 Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, "Iran and the Cold War: the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946" (Cambridge, 1992) pi50
14
One might consider John Beaumont's claim in isolation that 'there is a discrepancy between 
Britain's use of force against Iran and her conduct whilst in occupation and its claim to be 
representing a higher moral order in the conduits of international relations'. 25 Yet taken 
together with a series of other controversies detailed below, a case can be compiled against the 
British wartime government suggesting that there existed a subtext for the invasion and 
occupation of Iran which transcended the normal exigencies of war. What if Britain's agenda 
in Iran extended beyond the provision of supplies to Russia to the point where the occupation 
was in fact made in preparation for an expected Soviet collapse? Iran would then have become 
a battleground fought over by enemies from another continent engaged in another stage of the 
international game. Iran, to all intents and purposes, would have been no different than other 
neutral countries caught up in war such as Belgium and the Netherlands. The international 
community roundly condemned German occupation of these countries. Also, what would be 
the historical repercussions of our view of British diplomacy if one could show an agenda of 
long-term British economic self-interest superseded British concerns for long-term Iranian 
political integrity, social welfare and economic development?
Those who advocate this point of view point to the policy change that came about in the days 
following the invasion of Iran on August 25 th , 1941. Preceding this was a series of notes 
passed between the British legation and the Tehran government in which the British 
government attempted to obtain control of the Abadan and Naft-I-Shah oilfields. The rejection 
of these proposals resulted in the invasion and the immediate re-statement of the British 
proposals complete with extra demands for the withdrawal of Iranian troops from the north 
and east and the expulsion of German nationals. There was a complimentary pledge from the 
British government to continue to pay oil royalties and to respect and protect Iranian territorial 
integrity. 26 However, as F. Eshraghi has argued, the almost immediate adjustment of the 
British demands upon the Iranian government was a radical departure from these demands. 
Within days of Reza Shah calling a cease-fire on August 27, Churchill and the Chiefs-of-Staff 
had undercut the Eastern Department and HM. Ambassador in Tehran and increased the
*» Fm71/77155. Builard to FO, 22.10.45 
25 Beaumont, p 220
demands upon the Iranians. The British now required the full and unfettered use of the Iranian 
transport system, control of air and naval bases, the use of captured Iranian ships and the 
retreat of homogenous forces from an even wider area. The use of the brand new Trans-Iran 
railway also necessitated the occupation of Tehran, which had been previously set aside from 
the bounty of the occupation. Bullard, realising the consequences of these proposals objected, 
claiming that 'it was difficult to reconcile the list of requirements with the British Notes'. Yet 
Churchill clarified for his representative a fundamental premise of the occupation when he 
replied that 'any idea of pleasing the Iranian government should be dismissed'. 27
This episode is indicative of British wartime planning and policy in Iran. Churchill believed 
that Soviet forces would capitulate in the summer of 1942 and that consequently, the massed 
ranks of British troops necessary to police territory in Iran would be in direct conflict with 
German forces flooding in to the southern Soviet Union. Thus, Churchill would not have 
considered the long-term risks attached to Soviet troops moving in to northern Iran. He and 
the Chiefs of Staff engineered the withdrawal of Iranian troops from the British zone so that, 
when the Soviet capitulation came, Britain would be in full control of the southern oilfields 
with a natural barrier assisting British defence stretching across the Caucasus to the Caspian 
Sea.
The British not only failed to deliver a fair deal for Iran during the immediate aftermath of the 
invasion, but continued to do so over the following five years. The influence of the British 
legation and the presence of 30,000 troops in southern Iran had a destabilising effect on the 
highest echelons of Iranian politics leading to ten separate administrations during the 
occupation. Of these, six were openly pro-British. 28 Yet Bullard continued to castigate the 
Iranian officials whose country was paying a high price for the Allied war effort. Fawcett 
ascribes this to a belief amongst the legation that 'if British policies were unpopular, it was 
because the Persians did not know what was good for them'. 29 Above all, Britain made 'strong 
and stable' indigenous government impossible by firstly promoting the presence of large
26 Eshraghi, p 327 
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28 Fawcett, p 147
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numbers of allied troops and secondly by placing an intolerable strain upon Iran's resources. 
This was despite their publicly expressed desire to see Iranian affairs disrupted as little as 
possible by the inconvenience of the occupation. In society too, Iranians were paying a heavy 
price for the occupation and suffering as a result of British policies. Between 1941 and 1944, 
wholesale prices rose 400%; the cost of living by 600%.30 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden 
accepted the advice of Bullard and blamed Persians for 'hoarding, obstructionism and 
smuggling'. 31 Inflation had clearly been the product of an over stretch of Iran's resources 
coupled with successive harvest failures. And yet despite this strain upon the Iranian people, 
sections of the FO continued to believe that Britain owed the Persia nothing.
30 Fawcett, p 148
31 FO 371/31416. Eden to Sir A. Clerk-Kerr (Moscow). 03.11.42
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CHAPTER TWO
The Soviet war effort had begun badly and showed every indication throughout the latter half 
of 1941 and 1942 of imminent collapse. Without Russia's distractions in the east, British 
planners knew that German guns would soon be retrained on Britain. The cornerstone of 
British policy and to support the Soviet Union and if the occupation of a neutral country 
helped meet that requirement then the price was worth paying. British policy makers, for the 
most part at least, held no hidden agendas concerning Iran entering the year of Allied victory 
in 1945. Few members of the Foreign Office realised what a hornet's nest was being stirred up 
in the Middle East by a combination of Soviet interference and apparent indifference from the 
British delegation in Iran providing the economic concerns they had in the region remained 
intact. When the enforced wartime cordiality of Anglo-Soviet relations began to sour in!945, 
Iran was to become one of the first regions in which co-operation was put to the test. This 
Chapter will examine in detail the role of Iran in the formation of post-war inter-Allied 
relations from the end of the crucial Conference at Yalta until the Moscow Conference of 
Foreign Ministers in December 1945. This section will also examine the extent to which the 
British course in Iran was directed by economic concerns for the preservation of the oilfields 
in a year which was to prove decisive in shaping not only Iran's future, but also the post-war 
world.
Louise L'Estrange Fawcert contends that British planners held as their objective economic 
gratification at all costs. However, even Fawcert's polemic concedes that all Departments did 
not necessarily share identical objectives. The Foreign Office's concerns were multi-layered 
and complex, ranging from the diplomatic consequences of weakening Anglo-Soviet ties in 
Iran to the repercussions which would accompany the withdrawal of the British military from 
her zone of occupation. The Treasury, and the Ministry of Fuel and Power (MFP), as one 
might expect, was ever mindful of the potential of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Later in 
1945, a document circulated in the Ministry of Fuel and Power was to illustrate the true value 
of Persian oil. As peace dawned, Iran produced more oil than the other Arab nations combined
and Britain reaped the seed it had sown in 1907.32 Moreover, the MFP informed the FO of 
their fears for British economic interests in Persia as early as October 1944. 'We are naturally 
very concerned', wrote the Ministry, 'that any designs which Russia may have on Persia 
should not adversely affect our established position there'. Moreover, they stated, 'the 
possibility of our getting the additional concession now being negotiated with Shell' should 
not be discounted. As a solution to this problem, the memorandum questions whether if 'the 
Persian Government is going to deny the aspirations of the Russians in the north, it might not 
have the effect of increasing Russian interest in areas beyond that with which they are not 
apparently concerned.' 33
On approaching 1945 therefore, at least one of the major Departments concerned with the 
future of Iran advocated the pursuit of a spheres of influence deal. The Ministry of Fuel and 
Power asked whether 'If means could be found for an amicable negotiation, resulting in the 
granting of a concession to Shell, one would have thought that from the point of view of 
British interests in oil, such a solution would have much to recommend it.' 34 Yet on the 
political side of the argument, the Foreign Office and the British delegation in Tehran 
remained officially opposed to any such policy. This belief may well have been the result of 
knowledge that their chief partner in international affairs, the United States, would not 
countenance any British involvement in Treaty violations.
As a consequence of this fear of the US objecting to British methods in Iran, British officials 
may have been involved in the implementation of a number of top-secret lines of policy, 
which were directed against the Soviet insurgence in Iran. These policies stood in clear 
violation of Britain's Treaty obligations under the auspices of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. 
Furthermore, Britain's conduct was a serious indictment of her public support of the moral 
foundation of the Atlantic Charter, United Nations and the new world order. It will be shown 
that, whilst Foreign Ministers clinked glasses and patted backs at Yalta and Potsdam, events 
in Iran were already casting a shadow over inter-allied relations.
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An examination of British aspirations and objectives in Iran entering 1945 provides further 
evidence that sections the British government continued to follow a hidden agenda in Iran. In 
late 1944, British planners had been alerted to the Soviet ambition to secure an oil concession 
from Iran by the arrival of the Soviet diplomat Kavtaradze in Tehran. A combination of 
British opposition and uproar in the Majlis, under the guidance of Mussadiq, led to the 
rejection of the concession and the passing of legislation outlawing the grant of additional 
concessions whilst troops remained in occupation. One should be careful not to underestimate 
the legacy of this perverse diplomatic entanglement upon Anglo-Soviet relations in Iran. Eden 
claimed in his memoirs that Stalin had informed him at Yalta that 'You should never talk to 
Molotov about Iran ... Didn't you know that he had a resounding diplomatic defeat there? He 
is very sore with Iran.' 35 It has even been claimed that by limiting Soviet interest in Iran 
proper, the Foreign Office only served to direct Russia towards the more vulnerable and 
dislocated Azerbaijan. Certainly, the failure of the Kavtaradze Mission had highlighted the 
precariousness of the position of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the potential for social 
and political instability engendered by Soviet interference in the south. Traditional studies of 
the British occupation of Iran have argued that the British stiffening of the Sa'id government 
in 1944 and their reassurance that the Kavtaradze mission could be successfully repelled 
illustrated Britain's desire to preserve Iranian integrity and to discourage the Soviet Union 
from exploiting her position as an occupying power. 36 These studies failed to consider the 
inherent contradiction between the continuing expansion of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
oilfields parallel to the rejection of the Soviet application for a concession. 37 Furthermore, the 
moral triumphalism expressed by the British, which surrounded Mussadiq's Bill, would have 
been dampened had a simultaneous application for a rival concession by the British Shell Oil 
Company been made public knowledge. This truly was, as Fawcett describes, part of 'an 
allied scramble for Persian oil which made a mockery of earlier guarantees'. 38 The Kavtaradze 
Mission served only to highlight British self-interest undermining publicly altruistic 
declarations.
35 Lord Avon, The Reckoning, (London, 1962) p 595-6
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The fall of the pro-western Sa'id government, under the most intensive of Soviet pressure, 
illustrated the range and penetration of the Soviet political arsenal. It also provided much of 
the inspiration for the Russian sponsorship of the newborn Tudeh Party and their effort to end 
what she perceived to be the 'one-sided' politics of successive Iranian administrations. 
Ironically though, Bullard was to soon after indicate his belief that a spheres of influence 
arrangement, regarding oil at least, would be the most effective way of preserving British 
concerns in the south. He wrote after the Kavtaradze Mission that 'As to Russia's need for oil, 
it is certainly no part of our policy to prevent Russia from obtaining oil from northern Persia.' 
'Indeed', Bullard claimed, 'the Soviet Union is the natural market for north Persian oil/ 
Obviously, the sensitive nature of Anglo-Soviet relations during the war may have influenced 
the British Ambassador's line. Yet there was an undoubted certainty in Bullard's tone when 
he declared that 'We do not wish to put any obstacle in the way of Russians obtaining a 
concession in Persia by normal methods if and when the Persians are prepared to negotiate.' 39
The US Department of State, who had exerted an increasing level of influence upon Iranian 
affairs themselves through the Economic Development Committee (EDC) headed by 
Millspaugh, was showing genuine signs of concern about British policy. By October 1945, 
leading US figures in both Tehran and Washington were convinced that British policy in Iran 
was determined entirely by economic self-interest. After a tour of inspection one US official, 
after a tour of inspection in the Middle East, found that British policies would soon have a 
dramatic impact not only on the Middle Eastern region itself but also in the broad sweep on 
Anglo-US relations per se. Pepper predicted that 'if this situation continues, feelings and 
conflict will result which will seriously weaken co-operation and friendship between the 
British and ourselves. It will also endanger help both of us must give to the peoples of the 
Middle East.' 40
With Russia smarting over her refusal of an oil concession in Iran and the US convinced of 
British imperialistic motivations, the British reputation in the Middle East dangled
38 Fawcett, p 156 
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precariously over the precipice of accepted standards of diplomatic morality. Yet British 
planning remained in a state of flux throughout 1945. British officials failed to seize any of 
the frequent opportunities that emerged to establish themselves as defenders of the western 
ideals of liberal democracy or self-determination for smaller countries. Sir Reader Bullard's 
hastily produced list of Soviet Treaty violations in Iran since January 1942 detailed a set of 
serious misdemeanours that clearly impinged upon the political integrity of the occupied 
nation. The alleged incidents included complaints from the Persians that gendarmes had been 
obstructed by Soviet troops whilst attempted to suppress Kurdish rebels and had implicated 
Russia in the emerging movement for Kurdish separatism.41 The British had failed to even 
raise a note of protest. Consequently, when the desperate Iranian Prince Mozaffar Firiouz 
wrote to the British Member of Parliament Harold Nicholson to call for a display of British 
strength of purpose, he did so with plenty of ammunition to discharge at British planners. 'It 
is imperative', wrote Firiouz, 'that no conflict of interests between Russia and Britain surface 
in Iran because it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Persia may rightly be regarded as the 
thermometer of Anglo-Soviet relations'. The Crown Prince claimed that in the common 
Iranian perception, 'Anglo-Soviet relations are not based on reciprocity but are simply a one 
sided affair in which Great Britain gives and Soviet Russia takes'. Yet despite this view, 'anti- 
British propaganda has been met with a sang froid which is interpreted as a deplorable sign of 
apathy and weakness.' 42
But Pyman's frustrations with the manner of British propaganda were not simply a flippant 
expression of anger but instead a deeper reflection on the nature of the game being played out 
in Iran. The Russian press, armed with full State backing, could follow as caustically ardent 
an approach as they saw fit. Their Treaty violations, though explicit, were never reported in 
the Moscow press whilst rigid war-time censorship laws in Iran allowed the Soviet contingent 
in Tehran to veto the broadcast of anti-Soviet propaganda thus:
Any communication considered to be detrimental to the interests of Iran or her 
Allies, such as giving away state or war secrets, or spreading anti-Allied
40 FO371/45487, Enclosure in Halifax to Bevin, 19.11.45. Telegram from Pepper.
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propaganda, and any message likely to weaken the political or economic strength 
of the Allied governments, or to prejudice their friendly relations, may be 
condemned.43
Bullard wrote in April 1945 that the Moscow press was 'certainly behaving in a way which is 
far from indicating a desire for compromise'.44 The British press though were conspicuous in 
their absence in Tehran, meaning that Soviet misdemeanours went unreported. This was 
supplemented by the fact that public opinion at home was so clearly pro-Russian in the wake 
of VE Day that few papers would have wasted their newsprint on such stories.
Frustration with this under-reporting of the Iranian situation may well explain the blatant 
British failure to oppose the Soviet Union when it entered its most cantankerous form in May 
1945. Without an official organ to disseminate its views, the British delegation in Tehran 
appeared resigned to allowing the Soviet Union to engineer events in the northern part of Iran. 
For example, the news that Soviet troops had obstructed Persian gendarmes in the Kurdish 
region of Mahabad was greeted with the enthusiasm of a trout for salt water. 'If Russians were 
to attack Persians who had incurred the displeasure of the Tudeh Party', claimed Bullard, 'it 
would be for the Persian government to protest.' 45
The inference of Soviet conduct in obstructing gendarmes was that the Russians had a vested 
interest in encouraging Kurdish separatism. That stance was a clear breach of Article VI of the 
1942 Tripartite Treaty which committed the Allies 'not to adopt an attitude which is 
prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran ... and to 
use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against 
the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war.' 46
Any such encroachments upon Iran's rights could have been treated as an opportunity to 
stamp British authority on the situation, to display Britain's commitment to the Tripartite 
Treaty and to the new world order. Yet whilst, on May 7th , Whitehall digested the news of a
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Soviet-organised Iranian underground network in Tehran, British planners were still 
attempting to establish whether it was morally justifiable to launch a propaganda counter- 
attack on Russians stationed in Iran.
Their plan, such as it was, highlighted the failure of the Eastern Department to take a realistic 
view of the post-war Anglo-Soviet relationship. Bullard requested that the Foreign Office 
sponsor a British journalist to offset the imbalance in reportage from Tehran. The plan was to 
feed the journalist in the same way that Maximov, the Russian Ambassador in Tehran, briefed 
the Russian press corps. Bullard proposed the compilation of an academic study by his former 
FO colleague Elizabeth Monroe designed to answer Soviet challenges about Britain's imperial 
heritage in the Middle East.47 In Bullard's estimation, this plan would be sufficient to 'show 
the rest of the world what Soviet methods have cost Persia, and it might make the Russians 
behave themselves better.' 48
British attempts to regulate Soviet media coverage of events in Iran took several months to 
come to fruition. The abolition of the Anglo-Iranian-Soviet Censorship laws in Autumn 1945 
has been held out as a triumph of British firm-handedness and indeed some praise should be 
offered in the direction of the officials who backed the 'go-it-alone policy'. But it took until 
August 15 th before Bullard realised that this should be the course of action he should 
recommend; painfully slow even allowing for the Ambassador's notoriously conservative 
approach.49 More revealingly, it took the Foreign Office precisely a year after Bullard's 
recommendation to establish the 'Propaganda to Persia' sub-committee which came far too 
late in the day to effectively rebuff the great damage inflicted by unopposed Soviet 
propaganda. There is no real evidence to suggest that the objectives outlined in W.H. Young's 
minute entitled 'Publicity in Persia' were ever satisfactorily attained. 'The object of recent 
efforts to guide the press', wrote the Eastern Department official, 'is to corrupt the one-sided 
impression given by Tass messages (which are practically all that has reached the outside
47 FO371/45432, Tehran to FO, 07.05.45
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world from Persia as late); to encourage the Persian government; and to educate Persian 
public opinion here, particularly in relation to the withdrawal of British troops.' 50
On the same day that Young completed his minute, the FO authorised Bullard to support the 
Persian's desperate appeal for the normalisation of broadcasting restrictions and the banning 
of Persian-language broadcasts by the occupying powers. 51 But the horse had already bolted as 
swathes of judicious Soviet propaganda had swept through Radio Tehran, New Times, and 
other Tass organs in Tehran. It is worth considering an example of this propaganda to gauge 
the kind of impact upon the average Persian waiting for their country to be deconstructed by 
the occupying allies:
Regarding the statement in The Times concerning Persian politician's complaints 
alleging (sic.) they are not free to be masters in their own house, it would be 
appropriate to recall that most Persian politicians are oppressing the Persian 
people more than the foreign soldiers do. They have usurped the Persian people's 
rights and authority and have surrendered them to the British Empire's political 
representatives .... These statements by The Times remind one of a great English 
poet's words: "Whenever England speaks of freedom, she is forging chains". 52
One can also find reason for the FO's torpid response to Soviet propaganda in the desire to
maintain friendly Anglo-Soviet relations. Certainly, telegrams sent between London and
Tehran during this phase of the post-war scenario held this to be the justification for the
continued procrastination of British officials. However, there are several reasons to dispute
this contention. In the first place, it is insufficient to argue that the FO was without a
precedent on which to base their assumptions vis-a-vis Soviet conduct in Iran. The FO had
been served notice of the Soviet model of domination by the Polish example and the
installation of the Lublin Government at the expense of the London Poles. There too, the
incumbent government, though in exile, were labelled 'fascist', 'anti-democratic' and so on to
the point where their credibility was reduced to zero. In both cases, the proximity to the Soviet
Union of the occupied country was claimed to represent a threat to Soviet security. But unlike
the Polish example, where no Treaty obligations existed for the Soviet Union to obey or
50 FO371/45433, Young Minute, 'Publicity in Persia', 25.07.45
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disobey, Iran was the subject of a Treaty considered an essential cornerstone of alliance. For 
the British contingent, the dominant partner in the Tripartite Treaty and the occupier of 70% 
of Persian territory, to allow several months of unfettered anti-British and anti-Persian 
propaganda was a gross denial of her responsibilities to Iran.
It could be argued that the British government's failure to challenge Soviet propaganda 
resulted from a sure knowledge that Soviet sources would merely intensify their anti-British 
campaign. One factor that most certainly did undermine the British position was the failure of 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to develop its welfare conditions for its vast assortment of 
Iranian employees. This afforded easy pickings for eager Soviet observers and their cohorts 
amongst the Trades Union-based Tudeh Party, who were determined to portray the British as 
imperialist exploiter of indigenous labour. So poor were the living conditions amongst Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company employees that the timely visit of a Soviet Trades Union delegation sent 
shock waves through the Eastern Department. Bullard recommended that the delegation be 
refused permission to visit the site, claiming that 'Unfortunately welfare facilities for Persian 
labour in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were not so good that they would be convincing to 
the Soviet authorities'. 53 Baxter, realising that this situation meant it would be open season for 
Soviet propagandists, minuted his alarm; 'I thought that the A.I.O.C. facilities were better 
than this.' 54
By late July, the Tudeh claimed to have the support of some 70,000 members and to have a 
disproportionately high membership amongst Anglo-Iranian Oil Company employees. 55 
Bullard denied this to be true yet, when in the summer of 1946 a General Strike was called by 
the Tudeh, A.I.O.C. employees were quick to respond and in great number. When, in 1946, 
the British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin learnt of the conditions that Iranian employees were 
expected to suffer, he declared himself 'appalled'. 56 By then though, reform was to be too 
little, too late and the Tudeh had accrued a formidable battery to attack the British who were
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vulnerable to 'be accused in Soviet propaganda of all the crimes of imperialist and colonial 
exploitation'. 57
The British delegation's attempts to regain their status as the defenders of freedom and 
democracy were further undermined by the clever association in Soviet propaganda of British 
influence in Persia and unpopular former Persian leaders. Most notable amongst these figures 
was the former Persian Head of State and reviled dictator, Reza Shah, and his cohort Sayyid 
Zia. 58 Both were leading figures in the 1921 deposing of the Qajar dynasty but had become 
deeply unpopular after Reza Shah's promised modernisation plans produced limited results at 
a vast cost to the average Persian taxpayer. 59 Iran's troubled inter-war period was considered a 
bleak false dawn and the most prominent personalities involved could easily be dismissed by 
the Soviet press as 'reactionary' or 'fascist'. Thus, when the Soviet Union claimed that Britain 
was supporting the return to power of Reza Shah, or had been involved in Sayyid Zia's return 
from exile in 1944, they were striking very negative chords amongst the majority of Persians. 
Conversely, the Soviet press in Tehran was filled with associations made between the Russian 
contingent in Iran and movements for 'democracy' in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and for 
improved Labour rights through the Tudeh in the south. For example, the Tudeh wrote to the 
British Labour Party in early August to congratulate them on their election victory and to ask 
them for support:
Persia has been during the past years been suffering from internal elements 
under the influence of British agents and reactionary policy ... The Tudeh appeal 
for British help in establishing real democracy and freedom and eradicating 
internal reactionary elements and Fascist feudal system in Persia. 60
An association was successfully established between the British delegation in Persia, the 
'reactionary' agents named above and a dangerous and 'anti-democratic' movement in Iran. A 
British listening post picked up a Soviet transmission in August 1945 that claimed that 'It is 
known that the activities of the Iranian reactionary and pro-Fascist elements, headed by the
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adventurer Said Zia ed-Din, far from ceasing, have been increasing recently. His followers', 
claimed the Soviet authorities, 'and other reactionaries are trying to prepare in the country a 
favourable ground for their anti-popular dictatorship. Sa'id's terrorists are waging a stubborn 
struggle against the growing democratic movement, against the working classes and its free 
Trades Union organisation. 61
The unpopular Hakimi regime too was claimed to have close links with the British 
government. 'Hakimi's cohorts', claimed the Soviet news-agency, 'have usurped the Persian 
people's rights and authority and have surrendered them to the British Empire's political 
representatives.' 62
The problem with the British response to this propaganda is that one might justifiably have 
expected accusations linking representatives of the British government with alleged "fascists' 
would have been swiftly rebuked. However, this was far from being the case. Pyman, 
knowing the limitations of the British position, revealed much in his reaction to a report from 
Bullard that the Russians were attempting to usurp control of Radio Tehran to use exclusively 
to produce propaganda. 'Nothing much could be done to stop this', admitted Pyman, 'save the 
abolition of censorship and the withdrawal of troops by February.' 63
In August 1945, a P.I.C.M.E report claimed that the Russians were proving highly successful 
in depicting 'British missionary, medical and philanthropic activities .... to be officially 
directed and inspired by political motives'.64 One wonders how far Mrs Monroe's academic 
study had progressed? Also co-operation with the press in Persia had sunk to an all-time low 
after Quilliam, The Times' Middle East correspondent and contributor to the widely read 
P.I.C.M.E Report, was criticised by Bullard for being 'too ready to bring about a not guilty 
verdict against the Russians'. 65
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With the type and limitations of material available, it is difficult to establish the real link 
between the British government and the shadowy figures of Iranian politics. There are, 
however, a number of strong hints. Of the association with Reza Shah, there are a number of 
contradictory opinions about the level of British co-operation in his reign and recuperation in 
exile. On August 7th , Pyman minuted his frustration with the association of Britain and Reza 
Shah 'who most people regard, wrongly as our mouthpiece'.66 Yet, if the official line was to 
deny any complicity in the rise and rule of Reza, FO staff were failed to fully toe the line. 
L.F. Pyman began to minute his concern over the handling of the Soviet allegations by 
Bullard's delegation in Tehran. He confessed that the British government had failed to 
discredit links between Britain and Reza Shah. The argument, wrote Pyman, 'in which we 
have excused ourselves so vigorously as to confirm any Soviet suspicions' fortunately 
appeared 'to be dying a natural death.' 67
Again, Britain's pre-war imperialistic intrusion in the running of Persian affairs was to 
produce a legacy of exploitative deeds which the new Labour government was to find hard to 
paper over. Sayyid Zia's support of the 1921 revolution against the Qajar dynasty had been 
achieved with British support. Britain had supported the Reza Shah dictatorship, despite his 
despotic tendencies, as British economic development in the Abadan oilfields was 
unrestricted. So when, after the war had ended, a Party was founded under Sayyid to provide 
an extreme right-wing opposition to the emerging Tudeh, it was difficult for the British 
delegation to deny complicity in the foundation of the Hizbih-I Iradih Milli (National Will 
Party). 68
Furthermore, there is evidence that suggests that the Foreign Office was courting the idea of 
setting up a rival Party to the Tudeh throughout 1945. This would indicate a British desire to 
influence Iranian politics to the point of breaching her 1942 Tripartite Treaty obligations. The 
most compelling example followed a disturbing meeting between the US Ambassador in 
Moscow, Averill Harriman, and the British Charge d'Affairres there, Frank Roberts, on 
September 13 th . The US Ambassador believed that British policy was regressive in Persia and
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that she should not be sure of US support for her plans in the Middle East unless Britain 
showed 'more evidence of our favouring serious reform' and a stronger commitment to 
'defending smaller countries'.69 Harriman asked, rather pointedly, whether Britain was 'not 
making the mistake of backing the government in power however badly it governed and 
however little it carried out the radical reforms which were more necessary there than at most 
places?' The British response assumed that the US were keen to look outside the 
establishment of Iranian politics, which had been characterised by a succession of weak-kneed 
administrations which made little use of the Parliamentary functions of the Majlis. Pyman was 
in no way dismissive of what he assumed to be a US plan to permanently alter Iranian politics. 
'If Mr Harriman's criticism of our policy in Persia', pondered Pyman, 'means that he would 
like us to select one of the progressive Parties, finance it, organise it and incite it against its 
own government he should say so.' Added to this, Pyman admitted to his frustration with 
more publicly digestible lines of British policy; 'Short of this, I think we have done 
everything possible.' 70
Frank Roberts wrote to the FO a month later to outline the ever-growing scepticism with 
which the US perceived British policy in Iran and predicted that the US now wanted to see 'an 
indigenous progressive movement which will offer a concrete alternative to Moscow and its 
stooges', the Tudeh.71 Here again is an example of Foreign Office indecision that may, in part 
at least, have been attributable to the need to co-ordinate a joint Anglo-American policy in 
Persia. Pyman's initial response to Roberts' telegram was to repeat his belief that if the US 
desired to see a western-sponsored alternative, then they should be more explicit about it. 
Then, in his reply to Roberts, Pyman claimed that it would be immoral for Britain to offer 
'encouragement to any one such movement to the exclusion of others', despite believing 
Sayyid Zia's National Will Party to have a suitably 'progressive programme'. 72 But what is 
more important than the actual fact of illicit British involvement is to understand that the 
Iranian people, through the medium of the Soviet press, were repeatedly informed of that 
involvement and of British liaison with a Party who were 'notorious in Iran as and
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unconcealed paid agent of foreign powers and [who] systematically plot and conspire against 
the People's Party and the Trades Unions.' 73
A further symptom of the situation in which the British found themselves in 1945 was the 
suspicion with which the United States treated their supposedly closest ally regarding their 
plans for Iran. As Pyman had indicated in connection with plans to support Sayyid Zia's 
party, the British were dependent upon the United States for both financial and political 
support. Throughout 1945, the US retained its military presence in Iran with some 30,000 men 
manning the Persian corridor and the Trans-Iranian railway which allowed for the passage of 
crucial supplies to the USSR.74 Aside from this, the US remained the key players in a series of 
missions designed to provoke economic development in Iran. Moreover, the US was in the 
most advantageous position to extend its interest in Iran at the expense of her allies. US policy 
was without imperialist undertones, and the Iranians, who associated both Britain and the 
USSR with exploitative policies, considered the Americans trustworthier. 75 Of course, US 
policy in Iran may well in truth have been dictated by an equally selfish agenda as was British 
planning. Yet as early as 1943, American planners were keen to plough a separate furrow in 
Iran from the British so as to avoid lowering 'our own prestige and share to some extent the 
historical onus which is certain to attach to British action'. 76
By October, Bullard and other British officials in Iran were forecasting an increasingly 
gloomy future for Azerbaijan and her neighbouring provinces. A telegram despatched from 
Tehran on 21 October claimed that the Russians had begun to bore for oil in the northern 
provinces, whilst Soviet troop movements in Azerbaijan, claimed the British Military Attache, 
'hinted at a looming political move'. 77 Bullard also began to doubt whether the Russians 
intended to honour their commitment to withdraw from Iran along the guidelines established 
at Potsdam. 'Anything can happen in Persia', admitted Bullard; a statement he based upon his 
belief that 'it is odd that Molotov has refused from mentioning March 2nd (established as the
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date of withdrawal at the Potsdam Conference) as the date by which evacuation should come 
to an end.' 78
Despite the foreboding of these predictions, British planners failed to re-direct policy to meet 
the Soviet challenge. Bullard and Howe exchanged a series of notes outlining frustration with 
the failure of British propaganda to counter the claims of the Moscow press in Tehran, yet 
there was no tangible sign of increased resolve within the FO. Bullard lamented the failure of 
the Reuters agency to make use of his frequent offerings to them. 'I myself, he complained, 
'devote much time to publicity from which Reuters benefits or might benefit but much of it is 
thrown away'. 79
The Tabriz Consul attributed Russia's 'arbitrary attitude towards Persia' as being partly 
caused by the absence of Iranian news in the British press due to 'crowding out' by other 
major stories. 80 Yet despite the failure of the propaganda campaign, no other policy emerged 
to stiffen Iranian resolve or to indicate to the Soviet government that Britain aimed to hold 
fast in Persia. The Russians were clearly playing a clever game in Iran. Aware of British 
susceptibilities in the south and the weakness of the Hakimi regime without a strong message 
of support from the British, the Soviets realised that she could continue to poke and prod areas 
of weakness in Iran without fear of tough opposition. Molotov, in the lead up to the Moscow 
Conference, had determined to keep prodding until a threshold was crossed. His belief was 
that when a raw nerve was touched, Russia could safely climb down having attained most, if 
not all of her initial objectives in Iran.
When R.G. Howe, the Superintending-Under-Secretary at the Eastern Department, outlined 
his plan to confront the Soviet-inspired insurgence in Azerbaijan in late November 1945, 
several flaws had begun to undermine the British position. Firstly, the Atlantic Charter itself 
had become a potential tool for Soviet propagandists, who successfully claimed that Azeri 
'Democrats' and Kurdish nationalists had the right to secede from Iran, which, under British 
guidance, had oppressed the ethnic minorities in its regions for decades. This made Britain's
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determination to 'beat the Atlantic Charter drum' to the Americans, with a view to ensuring 
their co-operation in opposing the Soviet inspired insurgence all the more difficult. Howe's 
reaction to the continuing movement of Soviet troops in Azerbaijan was at least realistic. 'If 
this movement continues', Howe predicted, 'it seems likely to lead to the secession of 
Azerbaijan.' Howe based this view on his belief that 'without wishing to be alarmist, I cannot 
help thinking that the Russians are playing the same game in Persia as they have been doing 
in Bulgaria and other countries in the Balkans and that we may soon be faced with the same 
sort of fait accompli in Persia. 81
Howe planned to cajole the Persian government to send troops northwards. This was designed 
to invite Soviet forces to obstruct their path and to therefore confirm on an official level the 
suspicions of the world. In theory, and to Whitehall officials the plan made sense. However, 
Howe's plan was crucially undermined by the low confidence of the Persian government and 
the suspicion of British conduct widespread in the US. The second of these factors became 
manifest days later when James Byrnes, the US Secretary of State, refused to commit himself 
to making a joint protest about the Soviet troop activity in Persia at the forthcoming Moscow 
Conference of Foreign Ministers. 82 This rebuttal came despite the direct appeal of Foreign 
Secretary Bevin and paraphrased American concerns over the imperial reputation of her ally. 83
The short-sightedness of British policy in Iran was highlighted by the heightening of Anglo- 
US tensions in Iran, particularly between the respective delegations, at precisely the time 
when Russian troops threatened to force elections in Azerbaijan before the Treaty withdrawal 
date; the ultimate nightmare scenario which British planners had all year sought to avoid. 
Seizing upon the breakdown of Anglo-US co-operation, the Soviet Union was further able to 
apply pressure on the Hakimi regime in the capital with a view to installing a pro-Soviet 
regime in Tehran under the leadership of Qavam, who the FO believed to have been nursed by 
the Russians for over a year. 84
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It is worth tracing the decline of Anglo-US relations in Iran throughout 1945 to highlight just 
how obvious inter-allied tensions were to the Persians and, more explosively, to the Russians. 
At the outset of 1945, the US Department of State had claimed that its position in Iran was 
'permanent and ephemeral' and that her objective was to 'straighten Iran so as to enable the 
country to maintain internal order and so avoid weakness that invites foreign aggression'. 
Pyman approvingly minuted this report that 'it really means that they intend, after the war, to 
take positive action with a view to strengthening Persian independence'. 85 The enthusiastic 
response of the FO to the American resolve to support Persian independence underlined how 
crucial the backing of the US was to the British cause in Iran. But this level of harmony and 
mutual understanding lasted only a few months. A measure of decline came with the 
installation of Millspaugh's former right-hand, Wallace Murray, as the US Ambassador in 
May 1945. Bullard attributed his appointment to his being 'anti-British'. 86
However, through autumn 1945, Bullard's uneasy relationship with Murray continued to 
emblematic of Anglo-American relations deteriorating on several fronts. The catalyst in this 
was an emerging conflict of commercial interests in Iran and throughout the Middle East, 
ostensibly centred upon the oil rush but also concerning commercial air rights. The former 
aspect was the culmination of several years of US policy, which necessitated the end of 
British hegemony in Persia and the relative decline of British influence throughout the Middle 
East. In February 1945, then Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote that 'From a directly 
selfish point of view, it is to our interest that no Great Power be established on the Persian 
Gulf opposite the important American petroleum department in Saudi Arabia'. 87 US 
scepticism regarding British intentions in Iran first surfaced in January 1943 when a British 
expedition in the Middle East, which the FO claimed to be responsible for locust control, was 
found to suspiciously contain a number of geologists. 88 Consummate with that episode came a 
parallel Anglo-American dispute over the US plan to build an air base at Dharahn to replace
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the smaller British bases in Bahrain and Abadan. Stettinius, of the State Department, informed 
the British Minister in Washington Sir John Balfour in autumn 1945 that:
a covert contest which begins to assume unpleasant proportions is prevailing over 
air fields in the Middle East ... unless this contest was brought to a speedy 
conclusion, the generally co-operative live-and-let-live attitude that characterised 
Anglo-American relations in the region would be superseded by a dog-eat-dog 
policy which, if continued, has possibilities we are not presently able to appraise. 89
Such a distinct warning of the strength of the American determination to counter-balance 
British dominance in the Gulf resonated throughout the Foreign Office. The Eastern 
Department first expressed its concern about the implications of the American stance during 
the Kavtaradze Mission, which has recently become considered as a counter-measure by the 
Soviet government in response to the simultaneous approach to the Iranian government by the 
American Sinclair and Vacuum and the British Shell oil companies for concessions in the 
south.90 By October 1945, with failed bids to obtain oil concessions frustrating all parties and 
with future bids likely to be swayed by the amount of influence exerted by each government 
on the incumbent Persian administration, the US was clearly in competition with both of her 
war-time partners.
As Russian troops began to obstruct Persian military manoeuvres in Azerbaijan, Anglo-US 
co-operation was at its nadir. Britain had found herself in an unenviable and lonely position; 
confronted with a cadaverous Soviet delegation in Tehran and an unresponsive regime in 
Moscow, a staunchly anti-British US presence in Persia and a wavering Persian 
administration that stood at a political precipice with Molotov waiting to apply the terminal 
shove. One must though be careful to illustrate that Britain was palpable in causing Anglo- 
American discord. If one is to argue that the weakness in the western alliance, if such a thing 
existed, positively invited Russia to turn up the heat of the Iranian pressure cooker, one must 
first be sure of the level of British accountability in the weakening of the Anglo-American 
alliance.
89 ibid, p 314
90 ibid, p 320
35
Sir Reader Bullard defended the British government's input into its relationship with the US 
in Persia by claiming that the 'Best proof that we are not in favour of reactionary policies in 
Persia would be that we have always given strong support to American financial missions'. 91 
Bullard believed that Britain had remained loyal to her ally after the Stettinus talks of April 
1944, which had agreed the basis of greater S economic penetration in historically British 
areas of concern, providing that British interests were not challenged. The US State 
Department, however, did clearly not share Bullard's view. On October 18th , the US official 
McCloy submitted a report on his tour of the Middle East during which he had become 
increasingly frustrated with the direction of British policy and those who framed those 
policies. In response to a US bid to relieve Britain of some of her economic responsibilities, 
McCloy claimed that the United States 'participation in operations such as these (for example 
the Millspaugh mission in Iran) can only serve as a stimulus to the British'. 'In the long run', 
he claimed, 'Britain's overall strength can best be retained in this way.' McCloy suffixed a 
critique as to why British attitudes remained so hardened to US financial penetration; 'I 
imagine that high British officials may realise this but the idea fails to reach traditionalists of 
the Army and Civil Service in the Middle East. These people are hardened by a series of 
individual cases and unless they are vigorously prodded invariably follow a sure instinct to 
stifle the slightest move by us in this region.' 92
But there is evidence to suggest that the good-intentions engendered by the Stettinus Talks 
were quickly undermined by the vagaries of the Anglo-American relationship. Bullard, one of 
the 'old school' McCloy was so keen to decry, realised the reality of the American perspective 
towards British policy in Iran. 93 He claimed that in the US, critics of British policy would 
attribute her support of American Financial Missions to 'a sinister resolve to use the
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Americans as a catspaw against the Russians'. 94 Bullard confessed that Persia was likely to be 
'added to the number of countries where British officials are accused of obstructing 
Americans struggling to be top dog'. 95
However, whilst US officials had their altruistic reasons for seeking the mutual retreat of 
Soviet and British influence in the Middle East, US economic self-interest was probably of 
equal importance. A memorandum emanating from the Department of Near Eastern Affairs in 
1933 claimed that Iran 'was a country of outstanding interest from the economic viewpoint 
today'. 96 And at the Head of that Department, from 1929 to 1939, was one Wallace Murray. 
Attacks on British policy made by Murray, Pepper, and McCloy should be treated with some 
scepticism. The direction of US policy in Iran is lost on the historian amidst a barrage of 
American high-mindedness and lofty ideals which, though admirable in principle, are rarely 
applied to the letter in the orchestration of international relations. One cannot accept claims 
made by US officials about British policy being 'imperialistic' or 'divorced from the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter' without establishing the level of economic self-interest 
hidden behind American rhetoric. It is just possible that, as Barry Rubin claims, behind US 
professed altruism lay a resolve to ensure that governments 'empowered' by self- 
determination eventually decided to grant concessions to their American godfathers. 97 There 
may also be a case for arguing that the US secretly encouraged and covertly supported 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in his efforts to return Iran to autocracy and that consequently they 
little valued Iranian democracy in spite of their public declarations of absolute support.98 
Historical scepticism must apply equally to British and American claims.
What is clear is that a concerted Anglo-US objection to the exponential rise of the Azerbaijani 
Democrat Movement in late 1945 may have been the only response sufficient to ensure the 
avoidance of the much feared fait accompli; Azerbaijani elections held whilst Soviet troops
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remained in occupation. Yet the FO's response to the issuing of the ANC's demands on 24 
November 1945 was disorganised and owed little to Anglo-US co-operation. The Azerbaijani 
demands were cleverly phrased so as to avoid alienating international opinion. They called for 
political autonomy for Azerbaijan, but not for independence, and for the wider acceptance of 
the Azerbaijani identity and their unique Azeri language and culture. They asked for 
Azerbaijani deputies to remain in the Tehran Majlis and claimed that Azerbaijani taxes would 
continue to be sent to central funds." Bullard responded to the ANC proposals realising the 
extent to which public opinion had been swayed by the tone of Soviet propaganda and its 
intelligent allusions to the ideals of the new world order. The 'Russians of course have had all 
the cards in Azerbaijan but they had played them well' The 'ANC Declaration is ingenious', 
conceded Bullard, 'with its talk of Democracy and its appeal to the Democratic Powers and 
the Atlantic Charter'. 100
Yet Bullard's claim that the application of the ANC proposals would 'represent a base return 
for the services rendered by our Persian ally' rings somewhat hollow when contrasted with his 
frequently disparaging tone regarding Iranian efforts at democracy. Bullard had, of course, 
claimed some years earlier that the British debt to Russia utterly overshadowed any debt to 
the Iranian people. And despite support for an Anglo-American policy in all areas of global 
policy from Foreign Secretary Bevin, the FO instructed Bullard to avoid approaching the US 
delegation to make a joint protest against Russian interference in Iranian affairs. Instead, 
Cadogan instructed Bullard to 'insist that the Persian government be allowed to conduct their 
own affairs without interference'; thereby leaving Azerbaijan defenceless against the forces 
working furiously inside her and Iran essentially without foreign support against Soviet 
intervention. 101
To summarise the period up to the publication of the ANC proposals, the historian has to 
attempt to make thin brushstrokes with a thick paintbrush. There are indications in Foreign 
Office documents and in many of the historical works referenced above that Britain was 
complicit in a number of plots which would have run contrary to the post-war watchwords of
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democracy and self-determination. There is certainly evidence to suggest that British policy in 
Iran failed that country and jeopardised her chances of forging a path based upon 
parliamentary democracy that Iran had managed to preserve throughout the occupation. 
Whatever the reasons for the failure of the British Foreign Office to forge closer links with the 
Americans in Tehran and to mount a successful retaliatory propaganda campaign against the 
Soviet Union in 1945, a golden opportunity had been missed to establish the purity of British 
purpose in the Northern Tier. This suggests that the FO held the motivation not to be ousted in 
the southern and central area of Iran and to secure that territory for British purposes, whatever 
the price to be paid to the Russians in the north. One should remember the significance of the 
Middle East to the British, best summarised in the words of Bevin's biographer, Sir Alan 
Bullock:
The USA would now replace them as the leading non-Asian power in the Far East 
and the Pacific. But the Mediterranean and the Middle East were a different 
matter. Britain's role in that part of the world was of such a long standing that it 
was taken for granted by most Englishmen as part of a natural order, a belief 
confirmed by the effort the British had put into its defence during the war as the 
main theatre of British operations up to the invasion of Europe. 102
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CHAPTER THREE
The disturbing developments in Iran in the latter half of 1945 had illustrated to many 
observers the decline in British influence in the Iranian political circles, in the Middle East in 
general and, in association with a number of other factors, had underlined her decline as a 
Great Power. Despite the emergence of Ernest Bevin as one of Britain's most celebrated 
international statesman, Britain had found herself increasingly alienated from the Soviet 
Union and shell-shocked by the pace of developments in the post-war era. Nothing illustrated 
that fact more starkly than the division of British and American policy in the Middle East and, 
in particular, the diverging attitudes towards the role of the United Nations in the capitalist 
world's opposition to what was becoming a clear challenge posed by the Soviet Union to the 
Northern Tier; Iran, Turkey and Greece. The Soviet government had become impassive in its 
attitude towards Tehran and would settle for nothing less than a monopoly over northern Iran 
and a controlling stake in the government of the south. Their sponsorship of the Azerbaijan 
Democratic Party (ADP) and the Tudeh represented an unmistakable challenge to Iranian 
integrity and afforded Stalin the opportunity to undermine the British position in Iran using 
the exploitation of Persian labour by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as their principle 
justification. The British position was becoming increasingly untenable, leaving the United 
States as the chief confidante of the desperate Iranian governments of Hakimi and Qavam. 
This section will illustrate the shortcomings of British policy in Iran throughout 1946 resulted 
in not only divergence from the crucial American position but also in the dislocation of the 
A.I.O.C from the mainstream Iranian political consciousness. Within six years of the end of 
the war, Britain would abandon Abadan - defenceless against the forces of Iranian 
nationalism, which Bullard and his cohorts had so frequently disparaged and dismissed.
The year began in the wake of the frustrating Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers 
(MCFM), attended by Jimmy Byrnes, Molotov, Bevin and their ever-increasing entourages. 
American policy at this time was firmly entrenched in the second of Barry Rubin's three 
phases of development, typified by a perception of Russia's grizzly objectives and of Britain's 
diffidence but unconvinced of the extent to which US policy was capable of altering the 
seemingly inexorable tide towards Soviet domination. American policy was based upon the
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briefing memorandum prepared for Byrnes by Loy Henderson, the post war Director of the 
Office of Middle Eastern and African Affairs. His advice was to urge moderation, to promote 
compromise and to advertise the primary US goal of Iranian integrity and unity. The US 
should, argued Henderson, push for complete and immediate troop withdrawal with a spin-off 
compromise for the Soviet Union of access to the oil resources of northern Iran. The region, 
claimed Henderson, was 'a logical area for the development of petroleum for exportation to 
the Soviet Union'. 103 Henderson felt that the Iranian government would also find consolation 
in the American definition of 'sovereignty', which included their right to refuse the Soviet 
concession. Although Barry Rubin is critical of this phase of US policy in that it did not offer 
sufficient guarantee to the Iranians against the Soviet backed insurgence in Azerbaijan. 
Henderson's brief and the resulting US attitude at the MCFM at least delineated the 
assumption by the Americans of the policeman role in Iran.
The fall out of the MCFM was unsatisfactory. A British proposal that a tripartite committee be 
established to negotiate a settlement to the Iranian situation found limited support from the 
US. However, Molotov failed to concede that external intervention was required, and found 
ample diplomatic shelter behind his claim that were he to permit Iranian troops to the northern 
provinces they would be able to sabotage Soviet assets in the Baku region. Byrnes, in his 
memoirs, described this as 'the weakest excuse I ever heard him make'. 104 The Americans left 
Moscow as cynical as ever about the Soviet Union's intentions and resolved to harden their 
line through the new systems of international arbitration enshrined in the UN. The Russians 
believed that they had diplomatic law on their side in the shape of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian 
Treaty, which allowed Soviet troops to occupy northern Iran if Russian interests were 
threatened. 105 Nobody was convinced that Russian troops would withdraw or would not 
further incite the indigenous army. As the Foreign Ministers flew back home after a rather 
sombre Christmas, the Iranian situation appeared destined for peril.
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Whereas at various stages in this paper the British government has been criticised for failing 
to act decisively at crucial times, the MCFM was clearly not such an occasion. The Tripartite 
Committee comprising British, Soviet and US officials was proposed by Bevin on 19 
December; the only time at which the thorny but relatively speaking minor issue of Iran was 
raised. British calculations of American policy were though inaccurate. Bevin confided to his 
inner circle that he doubted that the US would take the lead at Moscow on the Iranian 
situation. He felt that the matter would need to be kept outside of the UN, which he 
considered unready for a such a challenge and instructed Bullard to discourage the Iranian 
government from making an appeal without Great Power backing. Bevin asserted that the 
Tripartite Committee would result in an increased British influence compared with discussion 
in the United Nations Security Council and would ingratiate him with the US, whom he felt 
were also opposed to recourse to the infant UN. This was a crucial error in judgement on the 
part of Bevin and his officials. Byrnes' assertion on 4 January that Russia will not play on 
[the] tripartite commission came as a hammer blow to the FO, who reacted with incredulity. 
Byrnes insisted that the Persians be allowed to appeal to international arbitration, effectively 
leaving the British proposals dead in the water. 106 Wallace Murray, the Ambassador in Iran 
and, since his days as head of the widely conceived anti-British Division of Near Eastern 
Affairs (DNEA), a critic of British policy in the country, reported that the British aimed at a 
'deal leaving Soviets [a] free hand in north while they consolidate British position in south'. 107 
The US and Britain had moved one further step apart and once again the British attitude 
appeared to savour of the self-serving motivations for which they were renowned in Iran.
The situation in Iran was to provide the United Nations with the first test of its resolve and 
also of the commitment of its members to make the organisation work. The new British Prime 
Minister, Clement Attlee, urged colleagues to 'make the success of the UNO the primary 
object of their foreign policy'. 108 However, several historians have cast doubt over the level of 
British commitment to the organisation when issues with a direct bearing upon British 
interests were mooted as candidates for UN consideration. The Iranian example is certainly 
one which has been used to illustrate indifference towards the UN at the highest levels of the
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British establishment. In January 1946, the Foreign Office was prescribing to the tortured 
Hakimi administration the inadvisability of a complaint to the UN. Under instruction from the 
Eastern Department, Bullard explained to the Iranian government that 'the filing of [a] claim 
would probably embarrass the infant UNO without bringing Persia any satisfaction in the 
end'. The United States, argues Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, were harbouring grave 
reservations about the British reluctance to report to the Council. She claims that 
postponement was borne out of 'the American belief that the selfish pursuit of its own 
interests still motivated British policy'. 110 Bullard himself noted that 'it would be most 
unfortunate if ... the impression which is already prevalent be intensified that the British are 
lukewarm and desirous merely of protecting their influence in the south'. 111
However, it is uncertain whether British policy makers disapproved of an Iranian appeal upon 
the basis of self-interest, believing that a deal could be reached with Molotov to assure the 
continuation of British interests, or due to a fear that the UN-route would prove ineffective in 
satisfying either Iranian or international expectations. In early 1946, frustrations with the 
Iranian Prime Minister Hakimi, whom Bullard described as being 'in a mental fog\ and with 
the 'naive' Americans contributed toward an uncertain air within the Eastern Department. 112 
The waiting period which followed the British proposals for the establishment of a Tripartite 
Committee of Enquiry only served to heighten those frustrations. Indeed British policy in Iran 
during the early days of 1946 appeared to be based on no fixed agenda and was reactive rather 
than pro-active in its dealings with the US, Iran and the USSR.
At Potsdam, Bevin had claimed of the Middle East that 'Britain's role in that part of the world 
was of such a long standing that it was taken for granted by most Englishmen as part of a 
natural order'. 113 He was adamant that despite the imminent setting of the sun on parts of 
Britain's global Empire, the Middle East should have remained under British influence. And 
yet by late 1945, Bevin and the Minister for Fuel and Power, Emanuel Shinwell, hit upon a
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plan to encourage US commercial penetration in the Middle East simultaneous with the 
'United States accepting greater political responsibility in the Middle East'. 114 The charge 
against British policy makers is that no clear direction came from the top. Also the co- 
ordination of Anglo-American strategic method was disjointed and tarnished by a history of 
imperial entanglements from which British planners failed to disassociate themselves.
But there were clearly factors other than a concern for the economic repercussions of 
disruption to the Abadan resource affecting British policy. One was clearly an 
acknowledgement in the FO that the British troops in Iran up to March 1946 were in no 
position to oppose the Soviet Union's troops in occupation or the war-ready Red Army who 
sat watchfully across the border. In December 1945 5,000 British troops sat resident in the 
south western region and in Tehran comparing unfavourably with the 30,000 Soviet troops in 
Azerbaijan alone. 115 It was this fact that guided British policy towards two crucial decisions in 
the first three months of 1946; that troops should be withdrawn on a unilateral basis if 
required but as per the Anglo-Soviet treaty obligations in the worst case scenario and that 
conflict with Russia in Iran was not an option. Yet this does not explain the British 
government's failure to realise that the only road to salvation for their interests in Iran and in 
their hopes of placating the Soviet Union lay in the stiffening of the American resolve to see 
international law prevail in the Middle East.
What does explain the British government's miscalculation of American resolve? W.R. Louis 
has argued that one consideration may have been jointly held Anglo-Soviet scepticism about 
America's staying power. Many senior figures in the FO, especially those who believed that 
the US intended to return to its policies of isolationism, believed 'America's enthusiasm for 
the principles of the United Nations to be ephemeral'. 116 R.G Howe prepared a brief towards 
the end of January in which he argued that the British should not take the lead in the UN as 
this would result in the United States allowing Britain to do all the work. Howe, expressing 
very real doubts about the future direction of US policy, doubted both the American
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commitment to the UN and their desire to see the Iranian situation referred to it. 117 However, a 
more persuasive argument for the underrating of American resolve lay in the misjudgement of 
both the frustration of the United States with British policy and the increasing value attached 
to American economic and political plans for Iran and the Middle East in general. Earlier 
Chapters have dealt with the evolution of American scepticism concerning British intentions 
even during the war. The State Department, and the DNEA in particular, had developed a 
distrust of and opposition to the continuation of British imperial policies, especially in 
Palestine but also in the Northern Tier and elsewhere. British planners had to contend for the 
first time with an assertive US influence in foreign affairs and it weighed heavily upon them.
Nowhere is this scepticism about US involvement in what had traditionally been considered 
British domain more evident than in the FO's attitude to Wallace Murray. Murray had been 
the Head of the DNEA between 1929 and March 1942, after which he succeeded to the 
influential role of Presidential Advisor on Political Affairs. As part of the former role he had 
acted as Deputy to Arthur Millspaugh, whose plans for economic reform in Persia have been 
discussed. The FO had throughout the war looked upon Murray as a nuisance and as being 
jaundiced against British imperial policy. An FO minute by Hubert Young claimed that 
'Everyone who has had to deal with Mr Murray, in Persia or in Washington, seems agreed 
that he is a hopeless case ... We must overcome him by force of argument and even, I think, 
by pulling his leg and making his Division look a little silly'. 118 Considered an ideal man to 
make the American case in Iran, Murray was appointed US Ambassador in Tehran in May 
1945. Bullard continued his criticism in a familiarly eccentric format: 'I should have liked 
before I retired to meet as American representative here one of those executives of few words 
and speedy action that are sometimes seen in films'. 119 Murray was considered a joke, a man 
whose views should be ignored in consideration of British-Iranian policy and, if necessary, 
ridiculed. In reaching this conclusion, although conceding that one has no personal experience 
of Mr Murray's character, it appears staggering that British officials could so underrate the 
importance of Murray's position; the US Ambassador in Tehran, who had the ear of the 
President, must surely have a role in the development of American Middle Eastern policy'?
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This type of condescension towards US officials, whether justified or not, is symptomatic of 
the British superiority complex in Middle Eastern affairs and should have received short shrift 
from senior officials, who had realised that British policy could only be made practicable with 
the support of the United States.
Isolated from US political and popular opinion, Britain pressed on with her policy of non- 
intervention on Iran's behalf. Consequently, Howe instructed Bullard to advise Hakimi 
against raising their own case to the UN on the tenuous grounds that 'Persia is so sure of the 
justice of her case that she willingly forewent this opportunity confident that if she wished to 
raise the question later she could secure the necessary support'. 120 To outside observers, the 
Tripartite Commission proposals, which Britain continued to back, and which included the 
establishment of Provincial Councils, would only serve to strip the Majlis of its power and 
reinforce pro-British administrations in southern regions. Fawcett claims this to be 
'tantamount to a spheres of influence agreement with the Russians'. 121 US officials were 
certainly furious that the British government found reason to advise against appeal, claiming 
even the remotest of hints at a spheres deal would 'savour too much of [our] past attitude 
towards Germany's victims'; past attitudes embodied by Churchill's 'Percentages Deal' with 
Stalin over Eastern Europe or, more starkly, of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. 122 A 
failure to report the issue to the UN would, claimed the State Department, 'cast serious doubts 
on intentions of our two governments to abide by their undertakings as members of UNO and 
would therefore be a blow at the authority of the UNO itself.' 123 Bevin, Halifax and other 
senior FO officials were painfully slow in realising that the Tripartite Commission's proposals 
were dead in the water after the US had expressed doubts about their efficacy. Bevin's claim 
that an immediate recourse to the UN would 'have wrecked any chance of Russian acceptance 
of the proposal for a tripartite commission' was therefore superseded by both the American 
and Iranian rejection of the policy. 124 Britain alone stood behind the proposals and FO officials
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appeared mistakenly convinced that their support alone was sufficient to bring the 
Commission into being.
The forced reorientation of British policy in the wake of the collapse of the Tripartite 
Committee plans was undermined by unpreparedness, by Britain's historical reputation for 
self-interest and by her failure to comprehend that the US had begun to dictate the direction of 
western policy. Britain had already gone a long way towards alienating the US over the 
Iranian issue despite an agreement within the FO that British policy should have been based 
on Anglo-American co-operation. As Ritchie Ovendale asserts, British economic dependence 
upon the US made a watertight co-ordination of policy the primary objective of British 
policy. 125 And yet through a failure to support the Iranian appeal to the UN and through the 
continued promotion of British interests in Iran, British planners succeeded only in playing 
into Russian hands. The Hakimi administration, which had tottered on the brink of collapse 
throughout autumn 1945, fell in mid-January as the indirect result of increasing Soviet 
influence in Tehran. So with Azerbaijan in the hands of the ADP and the allegedly pro- 
Russian Qavam Al Saltana installed as the new Persian Prime Minister, Russia appeared to 
hold many of the winning cards. Bullard conceded that it was possible that 'Soviet military 
and political pressure will secure [a] Government subservient to Russia', it was a veiled 
admission that initial British policies had failed to achieve their objectives. 126 The way was 
now clear for a redirection of policy and a general reassessment of Anglo-Soviet relations in 
the Middle East and beyond.
One of the most influential figures in the re-evaluation of Anglo-Iranian and more specifically 
Anglo-Soviet relations was the Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, Frank Roberts. Roberts 
communicated his view on the Middle East situation on 16 January. Iran, he claimed, was one 
of a number of countries which the Soviet Union considered to be 'client states' of the British 
empire 'which provide, in the Soviet phrase, springboards for aggression against the Soviet
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Union'. 127 Roberts predicted that any Soviet move towards expansionism would most likely 
come along its vulnerable southern border, which included Iran. This would be achieved with 
the justification of 'a sense of mission bringing western civilisation and material progress to 
the backward peoples of central Asia'. 128 The covert-sponsorship of Azerbaijani separatism 
was, claimed Roberts, an illustration of the Soviet intention to employ 'Sudetan tactics'; the 
laying out of the grievances of minorities with the long-term intention to absorb the area in to 
the Soviet orbit. It was a grim, frank but alarmingly accurate prediction of future Soviet policy 
throughout the world but also a reflection of the tide of events in Iran. Roberts wrote to Sir 
Christopher Warner, the Head of the Northern Department which shaped British-Soviet 
policy, on 14 January 1946 that Azerbaijan was being directed towards nothing less than 
autonomy under Soviet supervision, whilst the main body of Iran was to be railroaded away 
from British imperialist hands. 'The essential principle in regard of neighbours of the Soviet 
Union', wrote Roberts, 'was that the Soviet Union has spilt too much blood in this war to 
permit anti-Soviet regimes to be established on its flanks'. 129 Despite his rising star in the FO, 
Roberts' warning failed to force immediate stiffening in the British resolve to confront the 
Russian insurgence in Iran. Pyman, unrepentant and dismissive, minuted Roberts' telegram 
thus:
the Soviet government are merely out for spheres of influence and the longer we 
delay agreeing with them the less will be our own sphere of influence. 130
Pyman therefore conceded that British policy in Iran was operating on two levels. The first 
was an attempt to make practicable the ideals of the Atlantic Charter through inter-allied co- 
operation in Iran directed towards the reconstruction and reinforcement of Iranian democracy, 
supplemental to a reforming British presence through the auspices of the A.I.O.C. However, 
the failure of the Soviet government to play by the rules, coupled the weakness of the British 
position engendered by her imperialist reputation, forced the devising of a second plan. This 
was the re-division of Iran into spheres of influence, allowing Britain the opportunity to
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salvage at least its economic interests in southwest Iran. The key question for the FO was 
which of these goals was considered the more important?
However, observers also articulated suspicions about the changing tone of the British attitude 
towards the Iranian complaint to the UN. Despite Sir Alexander Cadogan's definition of the 
British role at the UN as 'seekers after truth', some believed that political motivations lay 
behind the decision to endorse the appeal. 131 In an important brief on the reversal of the British 
attitude, Howe described how any loss of face on the British side resulting from an 
unsuccessful unilateral anti-Soviet policy would cause a fatal injury to British prestige in the 
region. It was principally as a result of this fear that Howe expressed his 'interest in 
internationalising the problem'. 132 Howe's logic ran that if an appeal about Soviet conduct in 
northern Iran were to come from Iran or the US rather than from the UK delegation, then 
suspicions of British self-interest in the appeal would be less prevalent with the ten other 
member states on the United Nations Security Council. 133 Conversely, a non-British appeal 
would 'avoid giving the other members of the council the impression that the problem is an 
Anglo-Russian one and not Perso-Russian one at all/ 134 The decision of the United Nations 
Security Council to allow bilateral Soviet-Persian negotiations with the understanding that the 
council could reconvene to discuss the matter at any time was a devastating blow to anti- 
Soviet elements in Iran. For Britain though, the lack of alarm voiced in response to this 
decision reflected a sinister under-current. This was at least in part due to the fact that whilst 
Iran was forced to discuss the reversal of the Mussadiq Bill and the granting of a Perso-Soviet 
oil concession, UK companies too were able to explore the possibilities for further expansion 
in Iran.
A chronology of events surrounding the Perso-Russian discussions of February 1946 
highlights the British interest in extending oil rights in Persia. Following the failure of the 
Kavtaradze Mission in late 1944, the British government put on the back burner plans to push 
for a further concession from the Iranians to the Shell Oil Company. It was diplomatically
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impractical to continue negotiating after the Soviet government had received a considerable 
public rebuke by Mussadiq and his nationalist cohorts. However, the Ministry of Fuel and 
Power privately advocated an enquiry into extending British interest in oil beyond the limits 
of the A.I.O.C. The Department believed that denying Russia any concession in the north 
would have the effect of increasing Soviet interest in the south where Britain had a practically 
free hand since 1919. Their unoriginal answer was that '..if means could be found for an 
amicable negotiation, resulting in the granting of a concession to Russia at the same time that 
the Persians grant a concession to Shell, one would have thought from the point of view of 
British interests in oil, that such a solution would have much to recommend it.' 135 In short, the 
Ministry of Fuel and Power favoured the balancing of Soviet interests in the north with further 
British investments in the south with a view to satisfying the economic aspirations of the 
Soviet Union; a spheres of influence deal.
By March 1 st , 1946, the Ministry of Fuel and Power had their wish granted when FO officials 
granted permission for the Shell Oil Company to re-open negotiations with the Iranian 
government, left dormant since October 1944. The plan was to counter the expected granting 
of a Soviet concession in the north with both the new British concession and, it later emerged, 
with a parallel US concession. 136 This was the culmination therefore not only of Bevin and 
Shinwell's meeting in late 1945, but also in a sense of the FO's plans during the Kavtaradze 
Mission and the Stettinus Talks of April 1944.
This emphasis on the importance of oil adds a great deal of substance to the post-revisionist 
school's argument that this factor was the most important for the British government in 
determining its Iranian policy. This has been the contention of the leading lights in Middle 
Eastern Cold War history, including Gary Hess and Bruce Kuniholm for whom British policy 
was geared towards securing the prizes of Abadan. 137 the British outlook was Yet this view
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ignores the timing of the British policy shift of March 1946, which coincided with Stalin 
insisting that the new Persian PM Qavam be brought before him in Moscow and mercilessly 
bullied in to granting him a concession. On the very day before the deadline for the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops, Pyman wrote that the US should seek a concession in Persia and 
that Shell, a British company based upon Middle Eastern oil, combine in any prospective US 
bids. 138
The USSR was in many was the most proactive player in the early years of the Cold War and, 
in northern Iran at least, the single most important influence over the course of the Iranian 
Crisis. Bullard claimed that 'from the action of the Russians in Persia since August 1941 and 
from what we have seen of their policy elsewhere, that they intended from the beginning to 
utilise the presence of their troops to establish their influence in North Persia for good'. Their 
policy, claimed Bullard was to use 'every means to weaken the influence of the Persian 
government in Azerbaijan by interference in the civil administration' and to subsequently 
secure autonomy for the northern province. 139 Fawcett claims that in the eyes of the British 
government, Soviet policy during the war fell in to two distinct phases. The first was 
delineated by the beginning of the occupation and the German defeat at Stalingrad during 
which Soviet policy in Iran was limited to what the British labelled 'passive 
obstructionism'. 140 This period was characterised by the kind of nuisance value interference 
which Bullard complained of bitterly after the war but which he saw no reason to make an 
issue of during the joint-occupation. 141 The second period was typified by an upturn in 
aggressive intent in the Soviet attitude towards Iran as demonstrated by the Kavtaradze 
Mission, the launching of the anti-British propaganda campaign and the sponsorship of the 
ADP and Tudeh parties.
The Soviet Union was motivated in its Iranian policy by many diverse factors but in many 
respects their ambitions ran parallel with the British; the separating factor was their method. 
D'Arcy's capture of the Iranian oil concession at the beginning of the Century had robbed
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Russia of what transpired to be an astronomically plentiful source of fuel, in a neighbouring 
country that fell naturally into the Soviet sphere. Moreover, the area south of Batum and Kars 
on the Soviet's vulnerable southern flank was not only oil rich. Molotov and his military 
advisors also considered this region to be the most likely centre of a western assault upon the 
USSR. The vulnerable oil producing regions of Batum and Baku were expected to produce 
two-thirds of all Russian oil and had been proven vulnerable after Allied plans to destroy the 
Caucasus oil fields had been leaked by the Germans in early 1940. The region was perhaps the 
most crucial source of energy in the Soviet bid to begin to recover from the physical 
devastation of the eastern war. Thus, Stalin may have been sincere in December 1945 when he 
told Allied Foreign Ministers that Soviet troops had to remain in Azerbaijan to guard against 
sabotage directed against Batum from Iranian nationalists. 142 Molotov claimed that 'a man 
with a box of matches could cause serious damage'; an argument ridiculed by Byrnes and 
generally derided in the FO. 143 Molotov had a point when, in mid-January 1946, they cited the 
1921 Anglo-Persian Treaty which allowed Russian troops to occupy northern Iran if a threat 
was posed to Soviet security; international law ironically worked in Stalin's favour. Soviet 
conduct may therefore be characterised by a cadaverous streak which had been intensified by 
the success of their policies in Eastern Europe. Stalin's ploy was to force negotiations with the 
new Prime Minister, Qavam al-Saltana under duress whilst Soviet troops were in occupation 
and, as Bullard described, to 'get him to Moscow in order to screw some promise out of 
him'. 144 There is no doubt that Russian methods in Azerbaijan were underhand and selfishly 
motivated. However, it is fair to conclude that Soviet policies were also encouraged by a 
genuine fear of a Perso-British threat from the south and by a sense of injustice; which was to 
an extent the result of inter-war British policy in Iran. When, in February 1946, Stalin finally 
managed to confront Qavam in Moscow, his demands were for a joint Perso-Soviet oil 
company in the north, for air transportation rights and for a port at Pahlavi. 145 The USSR, 
whilst encouraging minority groups in Azerbaijan, actually only ever advocated autonomy for 
the region and not separation. Through clever politicking and by outflanking British efforts to 
expose her hidden motives, the Soviet Union managed to disguise her conduct. Outside of the
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United States and Britain, many people accepted Russia's apparent attempt to create a 
defence-mechanism against potential western aggression.
Seemingly absolved of their traditional instinct towards isolationism, the United States had 
become an ever-more active player in the Middle East since the end of the Great War. The 
financial and religious missions described in previous chapters coupled with a growing desire 
to obtain overseas investments represented the level of US interest up to the next global war. 
However, commensurate with the presence of American troops in occupation came an ever- 
growing resolve to see a more tangible reward for their efforts in Iran. The State Department 
believed that 'The United States is the only nation in a position to render effective aid to Iran'. 
But furthermore, they also ardently believed that 'Only we can restrain Britain and Russia', 
showing that US interests in Iran could only have been enhanced through the progressive 
discredit of her competitors. As Fawcett argues, Roosevelt's decision to add the US' name to 
the Allied Declaration on Iran in 1943 'was less a reflection of allied solidarity than it was a 
demonstration of the administration's conviction that the US had a vital and permanent stake 
in Iran's future'. 146 And despite F. D. Roosevelt's conviction that he was 'rather thrilled with 
the idea of using Iran as an example of what we (the United States)could do by an unselfish 
American policy', several of his advisors had a markedly different view of Iran's value to the 
United States. 147
The first indication of this came during the Kavtaradze Mission when the US had acted in 
conjunction with British authorities in seeking a parallel settlement to the expected granting of 
a Soviet concession. US officials defended their interest through claiming that the Sa'id 
government actually approached the US to bid for a concession to counter-balance Soviet 
interests. However, as with the British, the American's repeatedly high-minded, idealistic 
statements of support for the new world order was not matched with the expected high-level 
of active commitment. Parallel with the rising level of US commercial interest came a 
growing awareness that any advantage accrued in Iran would need to be reinforced by the 
support of an Iranian administration that was sympathetic to America.
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Habib Ladjevardi has gone so far as to argue that elements within the US government secretly 
abandoned its principles concerning self-determination and democratic renewal over Iran and 
sought to return the country to autocratic rule in the interest of US economic gratification. 148 
By December 1944, only a month after the Kavtaradze Mission, US Ambassador Averill 
Harriman had come under pressure to promote a return to power of the disempowered Reza 
Shah. An official close to Harriman wrote at the time that 'Iran, like a small child, needs a 
strong governing hand until education has done its work, political consciousness has 
developed, and a group of properly trained public officials been established.' 149 And that 
guidance, the US delegation believed, would have been better to come from one figure under 
US influence than from the Majlis, where rogue pro-Soviet or pro-British elements might 
have placed unwelcome obstacles in her path.
There is, though, insufficient evidence to conclude that had become an established goal of US 
policy. US State Department support was far from absolute and most officials appeared to be 
ready to support any Iranian leader who could fulfil America's primary objective; 'to prevent 
one more country from falling completely into the Moscow orbit'. 150 This aim was uppermost 
in American thoughts when the elderly Qavam al Saltana was being touted as Hakimi's 
successor as Prime Minister. The US chose to disregard repeated British warnings about 
Qavam being pro-Soviet or and trusted their own judgement that 'if anyone can steer this ship 
of state through the dangerous waters it is now traversing, Qavam is the most likely 
instrument for the purpose'. 151 Qavam was a figure of the Iranian establishment to whom hard- 
liners were attracted. So Ladjevardi's argument runs in to difficulties when the basic question 
is asked: if America had resolved to restore an absolutist ruler, why back a parliamentarian, a 
democrat?
American commitment in Iran hardened around the desire to oppose a Soviet fait accompli 
and to promote US investments, both standing and future in Iranian oil and elsewhere in this
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delicate region. But the method of achieving this aim sent shockwaves through Whitehall; the 
US, for the first time in time of a major post-war crisis, had resolved to 'go it alone'. 
Uppermost in the minds of policy makers was a belief that to act in line with the British 
government would discredit any policy that claimed to be based upon the altruism which 
Roosevelt had wished to see employed in Iran. As Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes was at 
pains to point out to his Ambassador in Tehran, 'American policy should not be based upon 
the same principles as that of Britain or the USSR'. 152 With the eyes of the world momentarily 
fixed upon Iran and with the efficacy of the UN placed under the microscope of public 
opinion, Byrnes stiffened in his resolve 'that... no one should obtain a false impression that 
our determination to carry out our obligations under the Charter and the Iran declaration has 
been influenced in the slightest by a selfish interest on our part in Iranian petroleum.' 153
This conviction, shared by Byrnes, Roosevelt and later Truman failed to disguise the fact that 
commercial interests remained another motivation for many in the United States. The 
expansion of the economic and financial missions during the war, the endorsement of the 
Tripartite Treaty and the continuous pressure from US companies to obtain an oil concession 
are evidence of this. However, a distinction should be mad between British and American 
commercial ambitions. The Abadan refinery and its complementary oilfields were absolutely 
crucial to Britain's post-war recovery; a factor considered to be of longer-term value to the 
British government than a respect for the British mandate in the United Nations. The United 
States, by contrast, held as it's primary objective the strengthening of pro-western elements in 
Iran to the extent that she would not become an open sore in US-Soviet relations.
Britain had become marginalized in Iran; a region in which she had enjoyed a virtual financial 
monopoly since the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement. As a result, the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company, the single largest overseas investment ever made by British government and 
business, stood on the brink of implosion. Lacking US support when she most needed it, 
facing the grant of a Soviet concession in the north and a direct threat to the Abadan fields
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through the rise of the Tudeh Party and its Trade Union adjutants, British policy began to take 
upon a desperate complexion.
The direction of British policy shifted with a realisation that by prolonging the occupation of 
Iran, advantage would be accrued by the power with the largest force in occupation and the 
closest physical proximity; the Soviet Union. 154 With the question of Azerbaijan now under 
the scrutiny of the UN, Bullard believed that Russia would press the new organisation to see 
the justice of her case; namely that in the face of a global shortage of petroleum, the Soviet 
Union had an unanswerable right to exploit Iranian oil. On the advice of Bullard, Bevin 
redirected British policy on February 5, 1946. All British personnel were to be withdrawn 
before the Treaty withdrawal date of March 2nd so as 'to give the Russians no excuse on that 
score'. 155 Bevin's hope was that the Russians would have been shamed into withdrawal and 
that this would allow British influence in Iran to solidify in the resulting period of relative 
calm. Bevin placed such emphasis on this move that he told Attlee that 'there must be no 
possibility of things going wrong'. 156 This was to be Bevin's ultimate gamble. Unfortunately 
for the Foreign Secretary his senior officials, who had resolved to follow an agenda separate 
from Bevin, seriously undermined his position.
The first note of discord over proposals to bring British troops home that attracted support in 
the FO came in early January. A note from the Indian Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, whose 
views were important owing to the criticality of Iran to India's defence, criticised the plan on 
the grounds that 'neither Russia nor Persia are likely to see our motives as altruistic, we 
should therefore gain little and lose influence in Persian affairs'. 157 Yet those who supported 
the retention of troops inside Iran failed to provide an alternative to withdrawal. Pyman and 
Bullard rejected the United States' request that a report be made to the United Nations 
Security Council by the British government on the grounds that it would draw attention to 
British conduct in Iran. Separately, Bullard argued that the questions raised by a UN probe in 
to Soviet claims for oil in Azerbaijan 'might lead to an unwelcome investigation into our
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interests in the south'. 158 Both attitudes reeked of British culpability; self-awareness of their 
monopoly position and a desire to see British conduct in Iran kept under wraps. Thus, perhaps 
with Bevin in ignorance of this situation, many important figures in the FO were unwilling to 
support the withdrawal of British troops.
When informed of some of these stark realities, Bevin himself conceded to Cabinet that an 
appeal should come from Persia and not from a Great Power; a stance that considerably 
reduced the chances of action through the UN. 159 British policy had consequently failed the 
anxious Qavam government, whose northern territory remained occupied by Soviet forces 
past the 2 March Treaty withdrawal date. Furthermore, the State Department, who had been so 
keen for Britain to absolve herself before the UN Security Council, barely concealed her 
continued disapproval of British policy. America for its part stalled in presenting the Iranian 
case themselves on the basis that they, unlike Britain, had not been a signatory of the 1942 
Tripartite Treaty. Lord Halifax in Washington informed the FO that this would mean that the 
US appeal would have carried a good deal less punch than had a complaint come from the 
British. 160 Yet despite Roberts' stark advice that the Soviet government had committed a 
'flagrant breach of their Treaty obligations', Bevin and his officials were adamant that the 
complaint should be 'put forward by the victim himself in all the stark circumstances'. 161
The FO's decision to advocate the extension of the British oil concession in Iran may not have 
been the result of long-term planning but instead the product of opportunism. On March 1 st , 
whilst Qavam was being exposed to the most extreme of pressures in Moscow and a Russo- 
Persian oil deal appeared imminent, the FO was in close contact with the Shell Oil 
Company. 162 By 9 March, British plans to benefit from the Iranian debacle had been refined to 
push for a joint Anglo-American concession. Mr Baxter of the Economic Relations 
Department, which had been closely involved with the formulation of British policy 
throughout, requested a more 'explicit' articulation of the British desire to draw the US in to 
Iranian affairs. Whilst Bevin objected to any 'attempt by any power to extract an oil
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concession by bullying', there was seemingly no complimentary objection to Britain 
attempting to benefit from the consequences of that Russian misdemeanour. 163 By the time 
Cadogan received instructions from London to press for all Soviet forces to be removed from 
all parts of Persia, negotiations between the Shell Oil Company and the Iranian government 
were already well advanced. As a consequence, it is fair to conclude that throughout one of 
the most turbulent periods of the post-war age, British officials attached a very high value to 
the furtherance of British interests in Iran. Yet, as US planners were equally aware, not to 
have obtained a concession parallel to the Soviet Union would have left the balance of power 
in Iran leaning precariously towards her northern neighbour.
Qavam's defiance of Soviet pressure in Moscow was quite astonishing and the publication of 
the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement represented what was, at best, a hollow victory for the 
Soviet government. Whereas the FO and the State Department had been convinced that an oil 
concession based on the A.I.O.C model was inevitable, Molotov was forced to accept a 
Russo-Iranian company which was to pass into solely Iranian ownership after twenty-five 
years. Iran had a 49% stake in the company and a right to believe that in the near future, Iran 
would be able herself to assume control of her most plentiful and lucrative resource. Britain 
and the United States accepted the agreement without complaint. The only reservations came 
from the Ministry of Fuel and Power, who expressed the concern that the Qavam deal offered 
Iran a far better deal than had the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; ultimately necessitating the 
redefinition of the A.I.O.C. By July, Bevin was privately advocating the abandoning of the 
A.I.O.C in favour of a mixed company that he confessed to be 'based on the Soviet model'. 164 
Bevin ordered that welfare reforms of indigenous A.I.O.C employees be hastened and that the 
Company be more generally integrated with Iranian culture; necessary measures, long 
overdue.
However a dispute between British economic and political considerations was soon to surface 
over Iran. The Ministry of Fuel and Power opposed Bevin's plans for reform. They claimed 
that 'a mixed company of the kind suggested would make it impossible to secure the essential
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flexibility in the operation of British oil resources'. The Ministry feared that if the A.I.O.C 
was to become linked with and partly responsible to elements in Iran, then British interests 
would suffer. w lt would hamper the British companies at every turn in task of obtaining the 
best possible results from an oil field, if the local government were associated with them in 
the ordinary day-to-day operations in the field.' 165 In short, no advantage would be accrued by 
the British.
This belief explains in part a great deal of the direction of British Iranian policy that emerged 
between March and July 1946. In the first place, British concerns for the continuation of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in its undiluted form accounts for the FO's continued reluctance 
to place its trust in the matter in the U.N.S.C. As late as April 3 rd, R.G. Howe claimed that 
'there is considerable doubt in this office as to the desirability of entrusting so highly political 
and controversial a question as Persian oil to the Council'. 166 British fears for the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company also account for the desire to extend its influence with further parallel 
concessions in the wake on the Qavam deal. A combination of a lack of British faith in the 
Council, an awareness of the US' superior international reputation, and a desire to counter- 
balance Soviet influence cumulatively explain the decision to approach the US with a view to 
bid for an Anglo-American concession. On April 4th, a Defence Committee Draft report on 
Persian Oil concluded that 'From a political point of view ... it is desirable that the Americans 
acquire a stake in south-east Persia'. 167 And whilst the approach of US Companies for 
concessions may hint at American economic motivations, their encouragement by the FO also 
hints at the British desire to retain influence in Iran through an Anglo-Soviet-American 
spheres deal. The agreement hammered out of the Persian Prime Minister whilst Soviet troops 
contravened the Tripartite Treaty commitments chapter and verse, was palatable to the FO. 
After all, 'The territory' involved in the settlement, Roberts wrote on April 8th , 'is 
considerably less than the Russian zone of influence under the [Anglo-Russian] 1907 
agreement'. 168
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Elements within the FO had clearly persevered with their attempts to bring off a spheres deal 
throughout the machinations of the crisis; no matter what the moral cost or the price paid by 
the unfortunate Iranians. It was clearly the case, however, that when confronted with the 
realisation that the USSR now posed a threat to the British strongholds of the Mediterranean 
and India, the redirection of British policy in Iran was swift and decisive. This decision to 
stand firmly behind the US in opposition to the rampant Soviet Union though owed little to a 
moral debt to Persia. Instead, the FO decision to help the US' 'get-tough' policy was part of a 
more general consensus that the Soviet Union had played only the first of many cards directed 
at trumping the British hand. In mid-April, Warner warned that 'the Russians were engaged 
in a general offensive against this country [Britain] which they regarded a weak limb in the 
Anglo-American capitalist bloc'. This realisation marked the resurrection of a theme which 
had lain dormant in FO circles for over a decade; a belief that the Soviet Union was following 
an overt policy of imperialism spouting from the dynamic thrust of Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Reassessments of Soviet intentions were to have a major impact on British Iranian policy. 
Frank Roberts, who was becoming ever more concerned by the events in Azerbaijan, painted a 
grim picture of Soviet intentions in the Middle East. Roberts highlighted the importance of 
ideology in Soviet planning and claimed that historical precedence also had a dramatic 
impact. 'Russian historic ambitions to control the Dardenelles and to reach the Persian Gulf, 
claimed Roberts, was an equal priority for the Soviet government as was their desire to secure 
its southwestern and most vulnerable flank. Roberts warned that the Soviet appetite was 
satiable only if they felt they had reached a point of over expansion and could not defend their 
borders against the assumedly crumbling capitalist powers. Roberts stressed that their plans 
were based in the long term and on the over-riding belief that their political system would 
inevitably triumph over corrupt western political cultures. 169 Regarding Persia, Roberts 
predicted that Russia expected to completely absorb the country into her orbit. He argued that 
whereas 'South Persian oil is no doubt of more immediate interest to the Soviet government 
than access to the Persian Gulf ... the two go together and the second is a historic Russian
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ambition and all such ambitions have been inherited by the Soviet regime'. 170 The Northern 
Department and former Moscow Embassy official Thomas Brimelow summarised, Roberts 
believed that 'The Soviet Union regards the Middle East as an artichoke to be eaten leaf by 
leaf. 171 Persia, the Foreign Office now accepted, was to be the first leaf.
By March 1946 therefore, most officials in the Foreign Office who were concerned with the 
formulation of British Soviet policy were convinced of the need to stand up to Russia in order 
to protect British interests in both the Middle East and the Mediterranean. There is clear 
evidence that a rift developed between the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and his staff at the 
FO; Bevin included. Attlee had determined in July 1945 that 'if the Russians were to be 
confronted it should be with the requirements of a world organisation for peace, not with the 
needs of the defence of the British Empire at the forefront'. 172 In his early tenure as Foreign 
Secretary at least, Bevin aligned himself with both the Chiefs of Staff and his most senior 
officials in arguing in favour of a ubiquitous anti-Soviet policy centred upon the need to retain 
Britain's most viable and lucrative commercial assets. No compromise settlement would be 
countenanced. Bevin believed that 'If Britain moved out of the Mediterranean [and the Middle 
East] then the Soviet Union would certainly move in and the Mediterranean countries, from 
the point of view of commerce and trade, economy and democracy, would be finished.' 173 The 
significance of this line in the context of Persia is obvious; the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 
potentially Britain's most valuable overseas asset, was not to be drawn under Soviet influence 
as part of a global redistribution of resources commensurate to each power's global stature. 
Attlee, on the other hand, showed signs of weakening in his resolve to see the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company preserved. Consequently, it may be possible to argue that as part of a process of 
Anglo-Soviet 'appeasement', Attlee wished to sacrifice British assets overseas in the name of 
his primary motivation in foreign policy; the insurance of a effective UNO. 174
Frustration with the lack of success of British policy in Iran since the end of the war was to 
become one of the pivotal factors in the redirection of British Soviet policy. Soviet
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propaganda had been successful in seeking to 'defend her conduct in Persia with a parallel 
counter-offensive regarding our conduct in Indonesia and Greece'. 175 And despite the US 
sponsored United Nations Security Council interruption of Russia's 'big-stick' methods in 
Iran, the Soviets still cast a shadow over the Abadan fields. Indeed, by July 1946, the Russians 
threatened to further assert their influence over workers in the A.I.O.C through their 
sponsorship of the Tudeh Party that had organised a series of industrial strikes in the oilfields. 
This fact was not lost upon the new Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Maurice Peterson. He wrote 
that 'The Russians had .. sponsored the Tudeh to concentrate on weakening Britain's position 
in the south, and especially in the Anglo-Iranian oilfields, where Soviet policy and 
propaganda became increasingly dangerous and hostile to British interests.' 176 It was this type 
of clever Soviet deception and manipulation of the world's media, argued Peterson, which 
would necessitate a reappraisal of the FO's own methods, not only in Persia but everywhere 
under Russian influence.
The FO recognised the need to be more effective in combating Soviet propaganda and indeed 
swifter in the creation of British Soviet-policy as a whole. The product of this recognition was 
the formation of the Russia Committee, made up of senior FO officials and experts drawn 
from all areas which had an impact on British Soviet policy. From its first sitting on April 2, 
1946, the Russia Committee produced some very persuasive and hard-hitting reports that had 
a decisive impact upon Ministers. Sir Christopher Warner, who chaired the Committee, 
claimed that his team had a brief to 'pool recent information regarding Russian doings .. in 
order to collate a picture and consider what action, political, economic, or in the publicity 
sphere should be taken as a result'. 177 The Committee had become convinced, through the 
Iranian Crisis as well as through their experiences in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean, that Russia had returned to an ideologically driven foreign policy. As part of 
that policy, the Russia Committee believed the USSR to have 'opened an offensive against as 
the leaders of social democracy in the world.' 178 At an early stage in proceedings. Sir N. 
Ronald outlined the impact that this would have on British interests that bordered on Russia,
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Persia in particular. The British policy was outlined during that first meeting; the United 
States was to be encouraged in its rise to commercial and political eminence in Persia but that 
the Persian example should be treated 'as perhaps rather a special case'. 179 At the Second 
Meeting on April 9, the Committee decided that this action would need to be immediate or 
else risk a scenario in which 'Russian influence would be so great that the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company would be disbanded'. Given Bevin's tacit agreement with his senior staff that 
British overseas investments were to be treated with the highest of priorities, one could easily 
see in this statement a scope for a desperate remedy to a desperate situation.
Remedial work was begun within weeks of the Russia Committee coming in to being. On the 
highest diplomatic level, the Committee passed instructions to the new British Ambassador in 
Tehran, Sir John Le Routegal, to approach the Iranian Prime Minister Qavam. 180 Warner 
requested Le Rougetel 'consider the means by which elements friendly to us could be induced 
to stand firm'; factions in Iranian society which ranged from the southern tribes to the Prime 
Minister.
Senior officials anticipated that this stiffening of friendly elements in Iran would be combined 
with a radical new wave of propaganda, based upon Kirkpatrick's brief of April 15 entitled 
'Anti-Communist Propaganda'. This infamous plan outlined why Russian propaganda, 
controlled directly by the State, had proved more effective than more conventional British 
methods. He called for a fresh policy based on the longer term or, as Kirkpatrick put it, 'we 
should aim at a steady drip rather than a sudden gush'. 181 Whereas Kirkpatrick's time scale 
was conservative, his intended methods were anything but. He advocated enlisting the support 
of the Governors of the BBC, of home and foreign press correspondents, of British politicians 
to avoid their 'uninformed intrusion', and of foreign politicians to 'do propaganda' in their 
countries. 182 And the primary objective of Kirkpatrick's plan; a wholesale assault upon the 
Soviet political ideology and a redressing of the balance in Britain's reputation left in tatters 
by the success of Soviet propaganda.
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This was to be the bedrock of the Russia Committee's advice to Bevin in his efforts to 
establish Britain's policy towards Persia in the months after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. 
Kirkpatrick's proposed mechanism for the effective dissemination of anti-Soviet propaganda 
was to prepare the ground for a campaign against the Soviet sponsored Tudeh Party. The 
Russia Committee attempted to impress upon Bevin the 'vital importance and urgency of 
taking the most drastic steps to resist the growth of Tudeh influence in the oilfields and to 
maintain in south Persia an administration friendly to us'. 183 On July 9, the Russia Committee 
informed Le Routegal that although 'we could not go so far as to place armed force at the 
disposal of the [Iranian] government', the Ambassador should stress to Qavam our 
determination to 'give them every form of support which we were able to offer'. 184 At long 
last, a clear sign had emerged which indicated a stern British intent to retain its influence in 
the Middle East as a whole and, more especially, in Persia. Under the wing of the United 
States, armed with new powers of expression and repression and prepared and ready to offer 
covert support to the Qavam regime if it resolved to oppose the Tudeh, British policy had 
begun to solidify. Robin Hankey, who was soon to become Head of the Northern Department, 
wrote to his namesake Maurice informing him that he thought 'Bevin would stand up to the 
Russians all right'. 185
Although initially encouraged by developments in British Soviet policy, officials were soon to 
become disenchanted with their master. By May 1946, Foreign Secretary Bevin was 
beginning to waver. Kirkpatrick's blueprint for the opening of a propaganda war was returned 
to the Russia Committee with a decisive rejection and minuted abhorrence with the plan. 
'This programme', noted Bevin, 'lacks the positive side of the New Britain. The more I study 
this the less I like it'. 186 Orme Sargent, the Permanent Under Secretary to the Foreign Office, 
protested strongly with his Minister and claimed that the entire Persian game would be lost 
without the backing that Kirkpatrick's scheme would provide. But the Foreign Secretary was
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adamant and, to the consternation of the entire FO, Kirkpatrick's scheme was rejected. From 
this point on, the initially promising relationship between Bevin and many of his most senior 
officials was to decline. Diplomatic reports from around the Commonwealth described the 
global perception of Britain's stance over Persia as seeming weakness. Sir Ronald Campbell 
wrote from Cairo that 'This campaign in Persia must gradually influence the peoples of the 
Middle East and even those who are favourably disposed towards us are puzzled by our 
failure to retort'. Campbell warned that 'The impression must become prevalent that we are 
afraid of the Soviet Union and that the latter is the winning horse'. 187
This dispute between Bevin and his officials over Persia was one symptom of a deeper-seated 
conflict concerning Britain's future role in the Middle East. Whilst this dispute intensified 
throughout the latter years of the Attlee government, the initial exchanges in 1946 had a very 
profound effect upon the shaping of British Iranian and British Soviet policy. Kirkpatrick's 
scheme had been an extreme measure designed for an extreme era. Yet its plans to employ the 
BBC as a State-managed propaganda tool and to commit the government to a radical anti- 
Soviet and anti-Communist programme would have meant Britain playing Russia's game; that 
was Bevin's complaint. On the other hand, whilst some biographers may criticise at Bevin for 
not following through with his support for his official's policies, not all of that criticism 
should be taken at face value. Subservient to and dependent upon his Prime Minister, who 
was committed to an internationalist and tolerant Soviet policy, Bevin was in an awkward 
position. Under the most enormous of pressure, he provoked the full wrath of the Russia 
Committee on July 28, 1946 when he rejected their plans for a 'full dress anti-Soviet
• r 188campaign .
The Russia Committee's resolve to oppose the Soviet Union's emerging post-war aims had 
become strongly influenced from two directions. Firstly came Frank Roberts' series of 
telegrams from Moscow alluded to earlier. Second, and more decisively, came a Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) report entitled 'Russia's Strategic Interests and Intentions' 
published in March 1946. The report concluded that Russia aimed to dominate the world
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within fifty years through a carefully engineered plan aimed in the first part at avoiding war 
though simultaneously planning to spread Soviet influence. The primary regions threatened by 
this plan were those not directly protected by both Britain and America; namely Turkey, the 
Mediterranean and Persia. 189 Roberts' prescribed a policy based upon reciprocity and 
superficial cordiality and above all on the presentation of a united front between Britain and 
the United States. 190 However, the FO came to realise that as well as having a decisive impact 
upon the formation of Russia's post-war planning, the Middle East had a vital role to play in 
British strategic considerations. The Chiefs of Staff wrote in July that in any potential war 
with Russia, a knockout blow to her southwestern oil-producing flank could only be launched 
through the air. Furthermore, 'It is only from the Middle East area', concluded the Chiefs Of 
Staff, 'that effective air action can be taken against this flank'. 191
This impact of the indecisive formulation of British Soviet policy first became evident in 
Persia. On 29 May, Le Routegal wrote to Bevin to impress this fact upon his indecisive 
master. 'It is indeed', wrote the British Ambassador, 'true to say that at the present time the 
security of the refinery and fields, and the safety of the British personnel depends on the 
goodwill and pleasure of the Tudeh Party'. 192 Le Routegal despaired of his position; the Tudeh 
had organised series of disturbing strikes and had begun to issue threats to the A.I.O.C 
employees. Simultaneously, Soviet propaganda organs scored success after success in the 
Abadan region in exposing the conditions which A.I.O.C employees were forced to endure. 
Roberts was despatched to team up with Le Routegal to find the truth. The conclusions were 
bleak. 'To the European observer', wrote Roberts, 'the general impression is of drabness and 
some squalor, which contrasts somewhat painfully with the excellent housing arrangements of 
the British staff. 193 Le Routegal added that such conditions provided 'a fertile ground for the 
agitator and the propagandist'.
A JIC report published on June 6 was the first official acknowledgement that the Tudeh 
threat was an indication of the Soviet campaign against Britain's position in the Middle East.
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The report concluded that the forthcoming elections in Persia would see the election of a pro- 
Soviet government who would be briefed to undermine British authority in the region. The 
JIC believed that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was in imminent peril. 194 A report published 
the following day indicated how drastic the Committee believed the situation to be. They 
estimated that 75% of the 40,000 strong indigenous workforce had joined the Tudeh by June 
1946, as compared with only 1,000 in November 1945. The report contended that the majority 
of Tudeh members had been 'coerced or intimidated to join' and that the strong-arm tactics 
used by the leaders of the union meant that they 'constituted a government within government 
in south Persia'. 195 Meanwhile, a measure of the decline in the level of British influence over 
the Persian administration came after a meeting between Le Routegal and Qavam on June 9. 
Le Routegal warned of the growing threat posed by the Tudeh and pleaded for a more 
determined opposition organised through the state. The Ambassador insisted that the Tudeh's 
claim to be an agency of reform be ignored in the light of their primary objective. This was, 
Le Routegal claimed, 'the attacking of all British connexions and interests in this country'. 196 
Qavam though, fresh from secret meetings with senior figures from the Tudeh, responded 
with the startling news that he was about to include a couple of Tudeh officials to his Cabinet. 
The deal, which became known as the June Agreement, went ahead within days and forced 
upon the FO another serious reconsideration of British goals in Iran.
A meeting of senior FO officials took place on June 14 to consider the British response to 
Qavam's U-turn. The ageing Persian Prime Minister had insisted that Britain submit a detailed 
statement of what she perceived British interests in Persia to be. The same was to be asked of 
the Russians in an effort to force the wartime allies to lay their cards on the table. The British 
reaction was, to say the least, negative. The meeting concluded that 'any attempt to redefine 
legitimate British interests in Persia would surely be challenged by both the Russians and the 
Persians, who would attempt to whittle away our definition in order to show that legitimate 
British interests in Persia are practically nil.' 197 In short, British officials were convinced that
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they could not adequately defend those interests and that on a legal basis, Russia and Persia 
held the winning cards. For that reason alone, Qavam's proposals were rejected.
Under the direction of Baxter, the Russia Committee resolved to fight for a spheres deal in a 
desperate bid to preserve the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Orme Sargent, the Permanent- 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office was similarly resolute in his determination to preserve 
the flow of Abadan-refined oil. He introduced a series of measures to senior colleagues on 
June 17 aimed at ensuring the continuation of British use of Persian resources. These included 
the continued application of political pressure upon Qavam to recognise the sinister resolve of 
the Tudeh; the support of an autonomy movement in south western Persia to create 'an 
Azerbaijan there under British inspiration'; the replacement of Persian labour from outside; 
the long-term development of Iraq and Kuwait as sources of alternative supply; and the 
education of the indigenous population about the efforts at housing and welfare reform 
planned by the British presence in Iran. The Committee recommended to Bevin that he 
recognise the Soviet claims over northern Iran, so long as the Soviet's response was an 
immediate counter-recognition of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In short, little over a year 
after the end of war in Europe, Sargent and his colleagues conceded that the preservation of 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had been their over-arching mission and that, as the dust 
settled, Britain had been powerless to prevent the cementing of the Soviet position in northern 
Iran. 198
American opposition to British self-interest in southern Iran had had a profound impact upon 
the formulation of a bipartisan US policy. At a crucial moment in July 1946, when the June 
Agreement appeared to have welded Iranian nationalist forces and pro-Soviet elements in 
Tehran into a cohesive anti-British force, America held back. Their justification for this; the 
fact that Byrnes believed that the British were unilaterally pressing for a 'Spheres deal', even 
at the cost of Azerbaijan and northern Iran being lost to the Soviet orbit. Barry Rubin has 
convincingly argued that the ultimate, some might say belated, American decision to go it 
alone in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East was forced upon them by frustrations with 
British policy objectives. The point is that Britain had failed to convince the US that it was
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prepared to assume greater responsibility for the policing of Iran. Even when Britain 
despatched a cruiser to Abadan in July 1946, to send a public message to the Tudeh, the US 
government were officially dismissive of their efforts. By October 1946, when American 
financial support to a newly invigorated Qavam government resulted in the expulsion of the 
Tudeh cabinet members, the FO had not been consulted. In December 1946, Iranian troops, 
financed armed and motivated by the US and, to a lesser degree, by the British, had 
reoccupied Azerbaijan. Yet Iranian nationalists, having repelled the Soviet threat and having 
been given the full backing an increasingly belligerent United States, now looked to drive its 
foe from the southeastern recess - blowing British power through Abadan and back to Britain. 
Britain had lost its capacity to resist.
The consequences of the Iranian debacle on the British side went beyond the redirection of her 
policy towards Iran. In the first instance, the Foreign Office perception of the role of the UN 
was darkened by the episode. A letter from Cadogan in New York in which he outlined his 
perception of the future role of the UN provoked a series of minutes relaying a pessimistic 
appraisal of the future. One official wrote, in an obvious criticism of the Soviet Union's role 
at the UN, of a 'disease which is quite incurable so long as the United Nations Security 
Council contains members of a totalitarian nature whose aims are purely ideological'. Sir 
Neville Butler, Assistant-under-Secretary at the FO since 1944, wrote of the serious limitation 
in the scope of UN action in the wake of the Iranian fiasco. The U.N.S.C would prove useful 
in 'educating United States public opinion concerning Russia', claimed Butler, but was 
seriously undermined by the Soviet Union's obvious determination to use its veto. Sir 
Christopher Warner too expressed reservations about the future of the UNO. Warner believed 
the UN to be powerless to oppose Soviet misdemeanours. The Security Council's importance 
was now limited to a theatre for the exposition of Soviet behaviour and for the education of 
world opinion. 'We should not be inclined', wrote Warner, 'as a matter of principle, to refrain 
from using the Security Council to expose Russian malpractice's, merely because they give 
rise to acrimonious discussions and end in the inevitable Russian veto/ It was a rather 
dispiriting, if pragmatic, conclusion that Warner reached when he claimed that 'The world
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will get used to accepting resolutions supported by a majority of the council as representing a 
fair judgement on a case'. 199
For decades, whilst the Cold War dominated international affairs, Warner's assessment of the 
future value of the UN held true; as much of a 'monkey house' as the Iranian Majlis ever was. 
If this paper has hoped to underline one point it is simply that British policy in Iran played a 
significant role in the deterioration of inter-Allied relations. The determination of regressive 
elements in the British government to secure a settlement with Soviet Russia over Iranian oil, 
in disregard of her moral commitment to Britain's public assurances of support for the 
instruments of the new world order and her legal commitment to leave Iran as she had found it 
in 1941, impacted gravely upon both Anglo-American and Anglo-Soviet relations. The 
Foreign Office, too, at the highest levels, produced a faltering response at crucial stages and 
did little to convince the United States of its altruistic intent. Nor did the British government 
show any sign of learning from its mistakes. The AIOC labour force continued to work in 
appalling conditions, contrasting sharply with those forced upon the British experts. Despite 
its socialist administration at home, Bevin, although reputedly troubled by this stance, and his 
officials refused to recognise the right of Iranians to assume control for and reap the financial 
benefits of nationalised resources. In 1950 British officials rejected a move by the liberal 
nationalist General Ali Razmara for a 50:50 Irano-British split of the AIOC, believing, 
wrongly, that a British monopoly could prevail. In 1951 British influence having declined the 
option to send troop in to Abadan to oppose nationalist forces. Britain left behind fifty years 
of muddled and self-serving quasi-rule, leaving the country subject to the vicissitudes of 
American foreign policy and ill-prepared to forge its own path.
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